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Disciplining Corporate Boards and Debtholders
Through Targeted Proxy Access
MICHELLE M. HARNER*
Corporate directors committed to a failed business strategy or unduly influenced by
the company’s debtholders need a dissenting voice—they need shareholder nominees
on the board. This Article examines the biases, conflicts, and external factors that
impact board decisions, particularly when a company faces financial distress. It
challenges the conventional wisdom that debt disciplines management, and it suggests that, in certain circumstances, the company would benefit from having the
shareholders’ perspective more actively represented on the board. To that end, the
Article proposes a bylaw that would give shareholders the ability to nominate directors upon the occurrence of predefined events. Such targeted proxy access would
incentivize boards to manage difficult operational and financial situations more proactively, while creating a reasonable oversight mechanism for shareholders if those
efforts fail. Moreover, the urgency of a company’s situation when a targeted proxy
access provision is triggered may warrant more lenient shareholder eligibility requirements, thereby more readily introducing the shareholders’ perspective into distressed situations. These refinements to traditional proxy access methodology also
could benefit companies considering or adopting general proxy access. Nevertheless, the Article suggests that targeted proxy access is a more tailored solution that
mitigates many of the concerns articulated in the proxy access debate and provides
a better balance between management autonomy and accountability.
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INTRODUCTION
The corporate boardroom is not for the faint of heart. Corporate directors frequently are called upon to make real time decisions involving complex financial and
operational matters. The stakes are high, and the choices are hard. Directors are required to act in the best interests of the company, but conflicts of interest, lenders or
investors with different agendas, or other factors may influence their judgment. 1 And
once directors have made a decision and committed to action, it is frequently difficult
to reverse course.2
Consider RadioShack Corp., a ninety-four-year-old company sold through a chapter 11 bankruptcy case and now existing as a shell of its former self. 3 Prior to the
bankruptcy, RadioShack was slow to innovate, suffered eleven consecutive quarters
of losses, and experienced significant turnover in key executive positions. 4 Yet despite these warning signs, RadioShack churned along and continued to hold onto
hope of a turnaround. The company’s last effort to achieve that objective was financed through a rescue loan package that ultimately led to the bankruptcy sale.
Perhaps RadioShack was destined to fail: the victim of an all-too-familiar creative
destruction story of an industry (i.e., brick-and-mortar electronics stores) that had
outlived its useful life, being replaced by new, more modern forms of product delivery.5 Alternatively, perhaps internal conflict or outside influences stymied the board
of directors, which failed to implement a creative reconstruction plan that would have
better positioned the company for the new economy. Could a new or different perspective have presented better prospects of saving RadioShack? This Article suggests
that the answer is “yes,” and it underscores the value of, and the role for, shareholder

1. See infra Parts I.AI.B.
2. The difficulties in changing course may stem from a variety of factors, including operational challenges and commitment bias on the part of the directors and management team.
See infra notes 60–63 and accompanying text.
3. For a detailed case study of RadioShack, see infra Part II.D. The purchaser in the
bankruptcy sale bought RadioShack’s trademark and 1733 of RadioShack’s more than 4000
stores. Lisa Fickenscher, RadioShack Has a New Strategy After Its Brush with Death, N.Y.
POST (Nov. 26, 2015, 8:19 PM), http://nypost.com/2015/11/26/radioshack-has-a-new-strategy
-after-its-brush-with-death/ [https://perma.cc/2QU7-3CRS] (noting scope of bankruptcy sale);
see infra Part II.D. The remaining stores were closed, causing thousands of employees to lose
their jobs, lessors to lose rental income, and suppliers to lose a customer. See Fickenscher,
supra.
4. See infra Part II.D
5. JOSEPH A. SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM, AND DEMOCRACY 83 (3d ed. 1950)
(explaining creative destruction generally as the “process of industrial mutation . . . that incessantly revolutionizes the economic structure from within, incessantly destroying the old one,
incessantly creating a new one” (emphasis in original) (footnote omitted)).
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nominees on the board in such a situation. It further suggests the use of a well-crafted
proxy access bylaw to implement the proposal.6
Boards of directors do represent the interests of shareholders generally, but that
perspective can become lost in the complex and often time-sensitive situations facing
corporate boards, particularly in times of financial distress. A targeted proxy access
bylaw would allow eligible shareholders to nominate candidates for the board precisely at a time when others—lenders, distressed debt investors, or special interest
groups—may have the board’s attention.7 A more direct shareholder perspective
could act as a counterbalance to the external, frequently biased interests represented
by these other players, providing boards with greater leverage in negotiations and
possibly more restructuring alternatives.
Shareholders of public companies are increasingly using shareholder proposals to
seek bylaws that would grant proxy access to certain categories of shareholders in all
director elections.8 The most common proxy access proposals allow shareholders
owning at least three percent of the company’s stock for at least three consecutive
years to nominate a certain number of director candidates.9 The nominating shareholder typically must make specific representations and disclosures in connection
with the nomination, and the company must include the nominating shareholder’s
statement in support of the nominees in its proxy materials. 10 Not all companies,

6. In an ordinary election proxy, the company (through its current board) identifies individuals to nominate for open board seats and includes the names of these individuals in the
company’s proxy materials, including the company’s proxy card. Shareholders may use the
proxy card to vote for directors in lieu of attending the annual meeting. “Proxy access refers
to shareholders’ ability to nominate directorial candidates of their choice to the corporation’s
proxy statement.” Lisa M. Fairfax, The Future of Shareholder Democracy, 84 IND. L.J. 1259,
1260 (2009).
7. See infra Part II.B.
8. See, e.g., Keir Gumbs, Ciarra Chavarria & Tanya Kapoor, The 2015 Proxy Season:
The Year of Proxy Access, INSIGHTS, July 2015, at 2, 2 (“For example, shareholders submitted
only 22 proxy access proposals in 2012, 17 in 2013, and 17 again in 2014. In 2015, however,
there has been a sharp increase in the number of proxy access shareholder proposals—as of
July 8, 2015 at least 108 proxy access shareholder proposals have been submitted.”). The
change in approach during the 2015 proxy season was facilitated, in part, by the City of New
York’s Office of the Comptroller’s Boardroom Accountability Project. See N.Y.C. OFFICE OF
THE COMPTROLLER, 2015 NEW YORK CITY PENSION FUNDS PROXY ACCESS SHAREOWNER
PROPOSAL (2014), http://comptroller.nyc.gov/wp-content/uploads/2014/11/Model-Proxy-Access.pdf
[https://perma.cc/X29N-WWZ4].
9. These guidelines generally follow the proxy access rules announced by the SEC in
2010. See infra Part III.A; see also, e.g., SIMPSON THACHER & BARTLETT LLP, MEMO SERIES
THE 2015 PROXY SEASON: PROXY ACCESS PROPOSALS (2015), http://www.stblaw.com/docs
/default-source/memos/firmmemo_07_30_15_proxy-access-proposals.pdf [https://perma.cc
/5KD8-5A3L] (outlining the general terms of proxy access bylaws proposed to, and adopted
by, companies); Bo Becker & Guhan Subramanian, Improving Director Elections, 3 HARV.
BUS. L. REV. 1, 33 (2013) (noting that in the context of the 2012 proxy season, “[t]he two
successful proposals both imposed an ownership threshold/holding period requirement of
3%/3 years, identical to the abandoned Rule 14a-11, while all of the unsuccessful proposals
had lower thresholds, typically 1%/1 year” (emphasis in original)).
10. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14n-101 (2015) (setting forth Schedule 14N, which applies to
nominations under proxy access bylaws and includes various disclosures by the nominating
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however, are willing to adopt such bylaws; indeed, not even all shareholders support
proxy access on such a blanket basis.
The views on proxy access vary both in the business community and academic
literature. For example, Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS) generally supports
proxy access meeting certain criteria, including the three percent, three-year ownership provisions discussed above.11 In fact, ISS released guidelines indicating that it
may recommend a vote against directors if a board’s implementation of proxy access
contains certain provisions that it views as problematic. 12 On the other side of the
debate, the Business Roundtable has suggested that “‘companies may have no choice
but to consider litigation’ to keep shareholders’ proxy access proposals off their ballots.”13 The voting results on proposed proxy access bylaws suggest that institutional
shareholders tend to support such proposals more readily than retail shareholders. 14

shareholder). See generally SULLIVAN & CROMWELL LLP, PROXY ACCESS BYLAW
DEVELOPMENT AND TRENDS (2015), https://www.sullcrom.com/siteFiles/Publications
/SC_Publication_Proxy_Access_Bylaw_Developments_and_Trends.pdf [https://perma.cc
/RK33-3GSU] (providing a detailed explanation of common terms found in proxy access
proposals).
11. See INSTITUTIONAL S’HOLDER SERVS., U.S. PROXY VOTING POLICIES AND PROCEDURES
(EXCLUDING COMPENSATION-RELATED): FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS (2016), https://www
.issgovernance.com/file/policy/us-policies-and-procedures-faq-14-march-2016.pdf [https://
perma.cc/7F4T-A3C4]; see also Howard B. Dicker, ISS Proxy Access FAQs: Problematic
Proxy Access Provisions, HARV. L. SCH.: F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (Jan. 5, 2016),
https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2016/01/05/iss-proxy-access-faqs-problematic-proxy-access-provisions
[https://perma.cc/PHK2-TK7B]. Another well-known proxy advisory firm, Glass Lewis, takes
a similar position, generally supporting proxy access but scrutinizing proposals before making
recommendations. See SIMPSON THACHER & BARTLETT LLP, supra note 9, at 9–10.
12. ISS suggests that it “may issue an adverse recommendation if a proxy access policy
implemented or proposed by management contains material restrictions more stringent than
those included in a majority-supported proxy access shareholder proposal with respect to the
following . . . .” INSTITUTIONAL S’HOLDER SERVS., supra note 11, at 19. The examples provided include ownership requirements above the three percent, three-year levels, aggregation
limits below twenty shareholders, and restrictions on the number of directors to be nominated
by shareholders below twenty percent of the board. Id. at 1920.
13. Kaja Whitehouse, Shareholders Threaten Boards over ‘Proxy Access,’ USA TODAY
(Jan. 27, 2015, 12:43 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/money/business/2015/01/27
/proxyaccess-investors-businessroundtable-wholefoods/22234271/ [https://perma.cc/LQN6-32T6]
(quoting a response letter by the Business Roundtable).
14. See, e.g., Press Release, Broadridge Fin. Sols., Inc., 2015 Proxy Season Results Show
that Retail Investors Voted Against Proxy Access Proposals, According to New Report from
Broadridge and PwC US (Aug. 27, 2015), http://www.broadridge.com/news-events/press-releases
/2015-Proxy-Season-Results-Show-that-Retail-Investors-Voted-Against-Proxy-Access-Proposals
-According-to-New-Report-from-Broadridge-and-PwC-US.html [https://perma.cc/6Z54-VMJS]
(“Of the over 80 proxy access proposals that came to a vote, 70% received the majority support
of shareholders, averaging 57% of the shares voted. Retail investors voted their shares against
proxy access in significant numbers, while institutions voted 61% of their shares in favor of
such proposals.”).
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Moreover, some large shareholders have adopted a case-by-case approach to
assessing proxy access proposals.15
Academics and other commentators acknowledge various advantages and disadvantages to proxy access. Supporters argue that proxy access can facilitate greater
director accountability, enhanced communications among directors and shareholders, and general governance efficiencies.16 Those who oppose proxy access emphasize that it can distract directors and management, allow special interests to gain
board representation, and add unnecessary cost and delay to the election process. 17
As with most worthy debates, the truth likely lies somewhere in the middle and depends on the particular company, its unique circumstances, and the makeup of its
shareholder base.18
The targeted proxy access proposal suggested by this Article strikes an appropriate balance among these competing considerations. It would not grant proxy access
in all cases. To the extent a company is doing well, the management of the company
should be in the hands of the board and management team without the potential distraction and costs of shareholder proxy access. If the company experiences difficulties that are not timely addressed, however, shareholders should have greater access
to the ballot to facilitate and assist in the company’s turnaround efforts. Both boards
and shareholders may be able to support such a balanced approach.
Notably, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) proposed a kind of

15. Institutional shareholders and private funds typically scrutinize proposals and consider the need for the bylaw and the terms of the proposal. See, e.g., David Benoit, BlackRock
Takes Its Own Advice on Proxy Access, WALL ST. J.: MONEYBEAT (Oct. 7, 2015, 4:39 PM),
http://blogs.wsj.com/moneybeat/2015/10/07/blackrock-takes-its-own-advice-on-proxy-access/
[https://perma.cc/C2A8-EAAB] (noting that BlackRock was giving its shareholders an
opportunity to vote on a proxy access proposal at its annual meeting and that, with respect to
other companies, “BlackRock and others have said they’ll review each company’s proposed
rule individually”).
16. See, e.g., Lucian A. Bebchuk & Scott Hirst, Private Ordering and the Proxy Access
Debate, 65 BUS. LAW. 329 (2010) (advocating for proxy access as a default regulatory rule
and outlining governance benefits); Lisa M. Fairfax, Mandating Board-Shareholder
Engagement?, 2013 U. ILL. L. REV. 821, 824–30 (highlighting benefits of proxy access in
context of increasing board-shareholder dialogue); Fairfax, supra note 6 (positing that proxy
access is more effective than other shareholder governance tools).
17. See, e.g., Joseph A. Grundfest, The SEC’s Proposed Proxy Access Rules: Politics,
Economics, and the Law, 65 BUS. LAW. 361 (2010) (criticizing proxy access regulation);
Marcel Kahan & Edward Rock, The Insignificance of Proxy Access, 97 VA. L. REV. 1347
(2011) (arguing that proxy access would have little impact on corporate governance); Bernard
S. Sharfman, Why Proxy Access Is Harmful to Corporate Governance, 37 J. CORP. L. 387
(2012) (highlighting structural deficiencies in proxy access that undercut its utility); see also
Jill E. Fisch, Leave It to Delaware: Why Congress Should Stay Out of Corporate Governance,
37 DEL. J. CORP. L. 731 (2013) (arguing that federal law should not regulate, among other
things, proxy access); J.W. Verret, Defending Against Shareholder Proxy Access: Delaware’s
Future Reviewing Company Defenses in the Era of Dodd-Frank, 36 J. CORP. L. 391, 397–404
(2011) (reviewing various perspectives on shareholder empowerment and proxy access).
18. But see Bernard S. Sharfman, What Theory and the Empirical Evidence Tell Us About
Proxy Access, J. L. ECON. & POL. (May 11, 2016), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm
?abstract_id=2757761.
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contingent proxy access in 2003 that would have given shareholders the ability to
nominate directors through the proxy statement under certain circumstances
unrelated to a company’s financial health. 19 Although some opposed the concept,
others supported such a refined approach to proxy access. 20 Similar to the SEC’s
2003 proposal, the targeted proxy access discussed in this Article rests on the notion
that not all companies may benefit from proxy access in all cases. The targeted proxy
access proposal, however, differs from the prior SEC proposal in two important
respects: companies and shareholders would implement such proxy access through
private ordering (and not federal regulation), and they would tailor the triggers to the
particular company, avoiding the complexity and uncertainty that plagues a one-sizefits-all approach.21
The effectiveness of targeted proxy access would depend largely on the terms of
the bylaw itself, which should be drafted and evaluated on a company-by-company
basis. In general, the triggers for proxy access should be objective and well defined—
for example, a material default under a credit facility or bond issuance; a restructuring, refinancing, or forbearance to avoid a material default under a credit facility or bond issuance; a downgrade by one of the major ratings agencies; or a certain
number of consecutive quarters of significant losses. 22 The Article draws on concepts
and terminology familiar to public companies under the disclosure guidelines established by the SEC for the Form 8-K: Current Report to guide the applicable triggers. 23
The bylaw also should seek to align the interests of the company and the shareholders
eligible to nominate directors once the bylaw is triggered. 24 Accordingly, both the
percentage and duration of ownership should be considered; proponents of targeted
proxy access could follow the three percent, three-year ownership model currently
invoked in many proxy access proposals, or they could recognize the urgency of the
triggers and invoke more lenient shareholder eligibility requirements and an accelerated nomination process akin to that granted preferred stockholders under many certificates and exchange listing requirements. 25

19. Facilitating Shareholder Director Nominations, Release Nos. 33-9136, 34-62764, 75
Fed. Reg. 56,668, 56,68081 (Sept. 16, 2010) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 200, 232, 240,
249) (explaining the triggers under the 2003 proposal as (i) one of the company’s nominees
“received withhold votes from more than 35% of the votes cast at an annual meeting” or (ii) a
shareholder proposal to adopt a shareholder nomination procedure “received more than 50%
of the votes cast on that proposal at the meeting”).
20. See id. at 56,681.
21. Id.
22. See infra Part III.B (including proposed language for a targeted proxy access bylaw).
23. See SEC. EXCH. COMM’N, FORM 8-K: CURRENT REPORT, https://www.sec.gov/about
/forms/form8-k.pdf [https://perma.cc/Y4CU-T8KD] (requiring disclosures concerning,
among other things, material definitive agreements and direct financial obligations).
24. See infra Part III.B.
25. See, e.g., N.Y. STOCK EXCH., LISTED COMPANY MANUAL § 313.00(C) (2016), http://
nysemanual.nyse.com/LCMTools/bookmark.asp?id=sx-ruling-nyse-policymanual_313.00
&manual=/lcm/sections/lcm-sections/ [https://perma.cc/XKD6-AJ5S] (“Preferred stock, voting as a class, should have the right to elect a minimum of two directors upon default of the
equivalent of six quarterly dividends. . . . The preferred stock quorum should be low enough
to ensure that the right to elect directors can be exercised as soon as it accrues.”); see also infra
notes 211–19 and accompanying text (discussing potential modifications to shareholder
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In addition to proxy access mechanics, the Article emphasizes the importance of
detailed shareholder disclosures and position statements to the utility of targeted
proxy access. Shareholders nominating directors should be required to provide at
least two kinds of individual disclosures: (i) information about their own holdings to
allow boards and other shareholders to evaluate whether the interests of the nominating shareholders are generally aligned with the company, or whether the nominating
shareholders instead hold an adverse agenda; and (ii) the qualifications, experience,
and other relevant information about their nominee(s). 26 Shareholders also should
endeavor to submit a position statement for the proxy materials that supports their
nominees and explains their justifications for the requested change in leadership.
As discussed in Part I.B, information provided to shareholders by management
may be biased or limited in scope and perspective. 27 The Darden Restaurants, Inc.
case study set forth in Part II.C illustrates the problems posed by such limited disclosures and how more robust disclosures by a shareholder in the context of a proxy
contest may assist a company and its shareholders. 28 Admittedly, boards and management resist competing informational disclosures in proxy materials. Nevertheless,
on balance and in cases of underperforming management or distressed situations,
such disclosures challenge management to make better decisions and encourage
shareholders to hold management accountable if warranted. 29 The case studies and
targeted proxy access discussed in this Article highlight the potential value to proxy
access in distressed situations, whether under a targeted or a more general proxy access bylaw. The design of targeted proxy access, however, offers incentives and
benefits not available through more traditional, general proxy access methodology.
Despite the potential value of targeted proxy access, boards, shareholders, and
other stakeholders may demur.30 Boards may be hesitant to cede control, even when
their performance or the challenges faced by the company suggest a new approach
or perspective is necessary. Shareholders may believe the proposal is too limited and
that they should have greater access to the ballot regardless of how the board and
company are performing. And other stakeholders (e.g., bondholders or employees)
may question shareholders’ interests in the company as the company’s financial distress grows more severe. The proposal considers these and other potential barriers to
the effectiveness of targeted proxy access. Importantly, the proposal incorporates
important safeguards and strikes a balance based on an objective that benefits all
sides: a profitable and stable company. A board of directors of a company with a
targeted proxy access bylaw will have every incentive to manage the company’s operational and financial challenges more proactively and avoid the triggers of the
bylaw. Shareholders and other stakeholders of that company should be well served

eligibility requirements, including the mandated holding period, to allow more effective
shareholder intervention in times of distress).
26. See infra text accompanying notes 217–19 (discussing proposed disclosures in more
detail and their relation to the disclosures required by the SEC’s Schedule 14N under 17 C.F.R.
§ 240.14n-101).
27. See infra Part I.B.
28. See infra Part II.C.
29. See infra Parts III.B–III.C.
30. See infra Part III.C (examining the potential implementation challenges to the targeted
proxy access proposal).
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as a result, with shareholders having appropriate recourse if management fails in
those efforts.31
Part I of the Article frames the primary underlying issue: potentially ineffective
or conflicted decision making by boards of directors, particularly in times of financial
distress. This section provides an overview of directors’ and officers’ fiduciary duties
and explains how those duties fail to provide adequate guidance in certain circumstances. Part II then discusses in more detail one such circumstance—boards making
decisions in the presence or under the influence of activist investors. Notably, both
shareholder and debtholder activism can impact board decision making. This section
sets forth two different case studies—one of Darden Restaurants, Inc. and one of
RadioShack Corp.—to illustrate different approaches to activism and potential consequences for the targets. Part III draws on the prior sections, including the case studies, to develop the justifications for, and key features of, the targeted proxy access
bylaw. The Article concludes by discussing the potential value for all stakeholders
of the additional information and new perspectives offered by targeted proxy access
and the presence of shareholder nominees on the boards of distressed companies.
I. THE PROBLEM: FIDUCIARIES SERVING MULTIPLE MASTERS
A board of directors manages the affairs of the corporation for the benefit of the
corporate entity and its shareholders.32 This division of management and ownership
creates agency costs, as no one shareholder necessarily has the economic incentive
to monitor the board and hold it accountable. 33 Moreover, a board must possess a
certain level of autonomy to govern a corporation effectively. 34 Striking the

31. As a company’s insolvency deepens, shareholders arguably have less of an interest in
the company and may have skewed incentives with respect to the company’s alternatives for
preserving value. Accordingly, the timing of any shareholder intervention is an important consideration in designing and implementing targeted proxy access. Part III.B proposes triggers
that permit shareholder intervention during the early stages of financial or operational distress.
It also proposes limitations on that access as a company’s financial condition deteriorates. See,
e.g., infra note 212.
32. State law generally delegates all management authority to the board of directors of
the corporation. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (2011) (“The business and affairs
of every corporation organized under this chapter shall be managed by or under the direction
of a board of directors . . . .”); MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 8.01(b) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2010) (“All
corporate powers shall be exercised by or under the authority of the board of directors of the
corporation, and the business and affairs of the corporation shall be managed by or under the
direction . . . of its board of directors . . . .”). A company’s insolvency may impact the beneficiaries of directors’ duties. See infra note 40.
33. See, e.g., Victor Brudney, Corporate Governance, Agency Costs, and the Rhetoric of
Contract, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 1403 (1985); Eugene F. Fama & Michael C. Jensen, Agency
Problems and Residual Claims, 26 J.L. & ECON. 327 (1983); Andrei Shleifer & Robert W.
Vishny, A Survey of Corporate Governance, 52 J. FIN. 737 (1997).
34. See, e.g., Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, Director Accountability and the
Mediating Role of the Corporate Board, 79 WASH. U. L.Q. 403, 424 (2001) (“Rather than
being agents, directors play a role that more closely resembles that of an autonomous trustee
or fiduciary who is charged with serving another’s interests.”); Donald C. Langevoort, The
Human Nature of Corporate Boards: Law, Norms, and the Unintended Consequences of
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appropriate balance between board autonomy and accountability is an ongoing
challenge in corporate governance law.35
A company experiencing financial distress perhaps illustrates this challenge most
vividly.36 The board of a distressed company needs the financial flexibility to, for
example, incur additional debt or refinance old debt; change operational course; and
implement layoffs, consolidations, closures, or other restructuring decisions. Nevertheless, the extent of each of these measures and what is reasonable and appropriate
under the circumstances are in many respects subjective determinations. 37 Many
questions arise: Is the board jeopardizing the long-term health of the company by
implementing short-term remedies? Is the board moving too slowly or too quickly?
Who is benefiting most from the board’s decisions—shareholders, creditors, or the board?
State corporate law attempts to guide a board’s determinations in these and other
scenarios through either common law or statutory fiduciary duties. 38 Board members
and senior officers generally owe a duty of care and loyalty to the corporate entity
and its shareholders.39 Financial distress not only blurs the boundaries of these

Independence and Accountability, 89 GEO. L.J. 797, 801–03, 813–19 (2001) (explaining the
three primary functions of a board, including monitoring, and how an appropriate balance of
independent and insider directors can mitigate biases that otherwise impede a board’s
effectiveness).
35. See, e.g., Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Business Judgment Rule as A[b]stention
Doctrine, 57 VAND. L. REV. 83, 109 (2004) (“Establishing the proper mix of deference and
accountability thus emerges as the central problem in applying the business judgment rule to
particular situations.”).
36. For a general discussion of issues facing boards of directors of financially distressed
companies, see Michelle M. Harner & Jamie Marincic Griffin, Facilitating Successful
Failures, 66 FLA. L. REV. 205 (2014). See also Stephen J. Lubben, The Board’s Duty To Keep
Its Options Open, 2015 U. ILL. L. REV. 817, 819 (2015) (“[S]tate corporate law imposes a duty
on the board to carefully consider any decision that will foreclose a future board’s choices. In
times of financial distress, this duty includes an obligation to carefully consider the effects of
a particular decision on future restructuring options.”).
37. See, e.g., Russell C. Silberglied, Litigating Fiduciary Duty Claims in Bankruptcy
Court and Beyond: Theory and Practical Considerations in an Evolving Environment, 10 J.
BUS. & TECH. L. 181 (2015) (examining, among other things, board decisions underlying
creditor and shareholder litigation in the distressed context).
38. See TAMAR FRANKEL, FIDUCIARY LAW 712 (2011) (describing general duties of fiduciaries). Whether directors’ and officers’ fiduciary duties are based in common law or statute (or some combination of the two) varies by state. See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-690
(2011) (“A director shall discharge his duties as a director, including his duties as a member
of a committee, in accordance with his good faith business judgment of the best interests of
the corporation.”); Willard v. Moneta Bldg. Supply, Inc., 515 S.E.2d 277, 284 (Va. 1999)
(“Code § 13.1-690(A) does not abrogate the common law duties of a director. It does, however,
set the standard by which a director is to discharge those duties.”); see also MODEL BUS. CORP.
ACT §§ 8.308.31 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2010) (standards of conduct and liability for directors);
Lyman Johnson, Delaware’s Non-Waivable Duties, 91 B.U. L. REV. 701, 705 (2011) (“The
[Delaware] General Assembly has never addressed the fiduciary duties of corporate officers,
leaving that subject entirely to the judiciary, which has likewise largely neglected these duties.
The General Assembly, however, has addressed the fiduciary duties of corporate directors, but
not to permit curtailing or negating those duties.” (footnote omitted)).
39. See Gantler v. Stephens, 965 A.2d 695, 708–09 (Del. 2009) (“In the past, we have
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fiduciary duties,40 but it also creates opportunities for conflicts of interest and selfdealing on the part of multiple parties. This section examines existing checks on a
board’s autonomy and accountability, highlighting weaknesses that often lead to
corporate governance failures and shareholder loss.
A. Overview of a Board’s Fiduciary Duties
Corporate board members and senior officers are fiduciaries. 41 These individuals
generally owe fiduciary duties, including duties of care and loyalty, to the corporate
entity and its shareholders.42 In theory, such obligations should deter misconduct and
produce beneficial outcomes. In practice, however, fiduciary duties are limited in

implied that officers of Delaware corporations, like directors, owe fiduciary duties of care and
loyalty, and that the fiduciary duties of officers are the same as those of directors. We now
explicitly so hold.” (footnote omitted)); Lyman P.Q. Johnson & David K. Millon, Recalling
Why Corporate Officers Are Fiduciaries, 46 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1597 (2005). See generally
Silberglied, supra note 37.
40. Questions arise concerning whether directors continue to owe their fiduciary duties
solely to the corporation and shareholders as the corporate entity approaches insolvency. Some
courts suggest that such duties may be owed to the corporate enterprise, which includes stakeholders other than shareholders. The Delaware Supreme Court has clarified “that the creditors
of a Delaware corporation that is either insolvent or in the zone of insolvency have no right,
as a matter of law, to assert direct claims for breach of fiduciary duty against the corporation’s
directors.” N. Am. Catholic Educ. Programming Found., Inc. v. Gheewalla, 930 A.2d 92, 94
(Del. 2007); see also Berg & Berg Enters., LLC v. Boyle, 100 Cal. Rptr. 3d 875, 894 (Cal. Ct.
App. 2009) (“[W]e hold that there is no fiduciary duty prescribed under California law that is
owed to creditors by directors of a corporation solely by virtue of its operating in the ‘zone’
or ‘vicinity’ of insolvency.”). The Delaware Chancery Court has further explained that creditors may bring derivative claims against corporate officers and directors for alleged breaches
of their fiduciary duties when the corporation is insolvent and that such standard does not
require the corporation to be “irretrievably insolvent.” Quadrant Structured Prods. Co. v.
Vertin, 115 A.3d 535, 556–61 (Del. Ch. 2015).
41. Silberglied, supra note 37.
42. See, e.g., N. Am. Catholic Educ. Programming Found., Inc., 930 A.2d at 99 (“It is
well established that the directors owe their fiduciary obligations to the corporation and its
shareholders.”); Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 179
(Del. 1986) (“[T]he directors owe fiduciary duties of care and loyalty to the corporation and
its shareholders.”). Although most commentators agree that directors and officers owe fiduciary duties to the corporation, they do not agree that such duties also run to the corporation’s
shareholders. See, e.g., Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, Specific Investment: Explaining
Anomalies in Corporate Law, 31 J. CORP. L. 719, 731 (2006) (“There is very little in corporate
law that supports [shareholder wealth maximization] and much that cuts against it.”); D.
Gordon Smith, The Shareholder Primacy Norm, 23 J. CORP. L. 277 (1998) (arguing against a
shareholder primacy norm). For a thoughtful review of the competing theories of corporate
governance and a recommendation for a more nimble, less board-centric approach, see
Anthony J. Casey & M. Todd Henderson, The Boundaries of “Team” Production of Corporate
Governance, 38 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 365 (2015). See also supra note 40 (discussing directors’
duties in the context of insolvency).
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scope and effect,43 as well as by the reality that the decisionmakers are human, 44 and
there rarely is one correct answer.
The duty of care requires board members and officers to serve the corporation in
good faith and with the same level of diligence, care, and skill of a reasonably prudent businessperson.45 Although the standard sounds stringent, a board’s duty of care
and resulting decisions are protected by the business judgment rule, which is a rebuttable presumption that the board acted in good faith, on an informed basis, and in
the best interests of the corporation.46 Plaintiffs typically find it difficult to overcome

43. See Kelli A. Alces, Beyond the Board of Directors, 46 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 783,
785 (2011) (arguing that “the board of directors in a large public corporation is ineffective to
perform the functions assigned to it and should thus be eliminated in favor of a governance
system that more accurately reflects corporate decision making”). For in-depth discussions of
limitations on board effectiveness based on board composition, see Lisa M. Fairfax, The
Uneasy Case for the Inside Director, 96 IOWA L. REV. 127 (2010); Nicola Faith Sharpe, The
Cosmetic Independence of Corporate Boards, 34 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1435, 1453–56 (2011).
44. A rich literature exists examining the human component of corporate boards. See, e.g.,
Stephen M. Bainbridge, Why a Board? Group Decisionmaking in Corporate Governance, 55
VAND. L. REV. 1, 2–3 (2002); Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, Trust, Trustworthiness, and
the Behavioral Foundations of Corporate Law, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1735, 1807–10 (2001);
Regina F. Burch, The Myth of the Unbiased Director, 41 AKRON L. REV. 509, 510–14 (2008);
James D. Cox & Harry L. Munsinger, Bias in the Boardroom: Psychological Foundations and
Legal Implications of Corporate Cohesion, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer 1985, at 83,
83–84, 99–108; Lawrence A. Cunningham, Beyond Liability: Rewarding Effective
Gatekeepers, 92 MINN. L. REV. 323, 363–65 (2007); Lynne L. Dallas, A Preliminary Inquiry
into the Responsibility of Corporations and Their Officers and Directors for Corporate Climate: The Psychology of Enron’s Demise, 35 RUTGERS L.J. 1, 2–4 (2003); Kent Greenfield,
Using Behavioral Economics To Show the Power and Efficiency of Corporate Law as Regulatory Tool, 35 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 581, 583–85 (2002); Donald C. Langevoort, Organized
Illusions: A Behavioral Theory of Why Corporations Mislead Stock Market Investors (and
Cause Other Social Harms), 146 U. PA. L. REV. 101, 107 (1997); Donald C. Langevoort, Resetting the Corporate Thermostat: Lessons from the Recent Financial Scandals About SelfDeception, Deceiving Others and the Design of Internal Controls, 93 GEO. L.J. 285, 288
(2004); Oliver Marnet, Behavior and Rationality in Corporate Governance, 39 J. ECON. ISSUES
613, 614, 619 (2005); Antony Page, Unconscious Bias and the Limits of Director Independence, 2009 U. ILL. L. REV. 237, 286–89 (2009). For an interesting proposal to use “board service providers” in lieu of natural persons, see Stephen M. Bainbridge & M. Todd Henderson,
Boards-R-Us: Reconceptualizing Corporate Boards, 66 STAN. L. REV. 1051 (2014).
45. See Graham v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 188 A.2d 125, 130 (Del. 1963) (“[I]t appears
that directors of a corporation in managing the corporate affairs are bound to use that amount
of care which ordinarily careful and prudent men would use in similar circumstances. Their
duties are those of control, and whether or not by neglect they have made themselves liable
for failure to exercise proper control depends on the circumstances and facts of the particular case.”).
46. See, e.g., Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244, 264 n.66 (Del. 2000) (“The business judgment rule has been well formulated by Aronson and other cases[ that it] ‘is a presumption that
in making a business decision the directors . . . acted on an informed basis, in good faith and
in the honest belief that the action taken was in the best interests of the corporation.’[] Thus,
directors’ decisions will be respected by courts unless the directors are interested or lack independence relative to the decision, do not act in good faith, act in a manner that cannot be
attributed to a rational business purpose or reach their decision by a grossly negligent process
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the business judgment rule and succeed in litigation against corporate directors and
officers, unless the plaintiffs can demonstrate a breach of the duty of loyalty.47 The
duty of loyalty is fairly broad and encompasses self-dealing, conflicts of interest, and
bad faith.48 Importantly, alleged breaches of the duty of loyalty are not protected by
the business judgment rule.
The literature concerning fiduciary duty litigation suggests that relatively few
judgments are entered against corporate directors and officers. 49 Rather, such litigation often is resolved in favor of the defendants at the motion to dismiss or summary
judgment stage, or settled prior to trial.50 Most of the literature also questions the
value of any judgment or settlement to the corporation because—particularly in the
settlement context—the monetary component typically covers primarily attorneys’
fees, and the promised corporate governance reforms are either of nominal impact or
already in place.51 Two notable exceptions to this general rule are in the context of
governance failures and securities litigation: the outside directors of WorldCom and
Enron agreed to pay approximately $24 million and $13 million, respectively, to settle securities class action litigation against them relating to collapse of their
companies.52

that includes the failure to consider all material facts reasonably available.” (quoting Aronson
v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984) (omission in original)).
47. See, e.g., Joy v. North, 692 F.2d 880, 885 (2d Cir. 1982) (“Whatever the terminology,
the fact is that liability is rarely imposed upon corporate directors or officers simply for bad
judgment and this reluctance to impose liability for unsuccessful business decisions has been
doctrinally labelled the business judgment rule.”).
48. See, e.g., Stone v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362, 370 (Del. 2006) (“[T]he fiduciary duty of
loyalty is not limited to cases involving a financial or other cognizable fiduciary conflict of
interest. It also encompasses cases where the fiduciary fails to act in good faith. . . . ‘[A] director cannot act loyally towards the corporation unless she acts in the good faith belief that
her actions are in the corporation’s best interest.’” (quoting Guttman v. Huang, 823 A.2d 492,
506 n. 34 (Del. Ch. 2003))).
49. See Ann M. Scarlett, A Better Approach for Balancing Authority and Accountability
in Shareholder Derivative Litigation, 57 U. KAN. L. REV. 39, 40 (2008) (“Shareholder derivative litigation, however, rarely succeeds in holding directors liable for their decisions.”).
50. Id. at 59 (“Under any formulation of the business judgment rule, it operates as a defense asserted in shareholder derivative actions that challenge a decision made by a corporation’s board of directors. Procedurally, defendants have been allowed to assert their business
judgment defense on a motion to dismiss, a motion for summary judgment, and at
trial.”(footnote omitted)).
51. See generally Tom Baker & Sean J. Griffith, Predicting Corporate Governance Risk:
Evidence from the Directors’ & Officers’ Liability Insurance Market, 74 U. CHI. L. REV. 487
(2007) (studying risk factors relevant to directors’ and officers’ liability insurance markets and
analyzing merits and results of director and officer litigation); Jessica Erickson, Corporate
Governance in the Courtroom: An Empirical Analysis, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1749 (2010)
(discussing general perception that shareholder derivative litigation lacks meaningful value
for corporate shareholders and presenting evidence that such litigation may do little to enhance
corporate governance measures at targeted firms).
52. See, e.g., Bernard Black, Brian Cheffins & Michael Klausner, Outside Director
Liability, 58 STAN. L. REV. 1055, 1057, 1059 (2006) (study discusses WorldCom and Enron
settlements, but finds that such personal liability for outside directors is the exception rather
than the rule).
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Despite its low success rate, fiduciary duty litigation arguably has a strong deterrent effect. No director or officer wants to be embroiled in years of very public litigation, even if they know they likely will succeed in the end. 53 Moreover, fiduciary
duties do provide general guidance for directors and officers—a basic framework for
making the tough decisions. Unfortunately, the flexibility in this framework may allow external factors to compromise its utility.
Consider the following two scenarios: In the first, the board is evaluating a sale
of the company to an insider. In the second, the board is contemplating a rescuefinancing package that will significantly increase the corporation’s leverage and decrease its operational discretion. In both scenarios, the board must balance the interests of the company and its shareholders. Most boards also will at least analyze the
impact of the transaction on employees, officers, creditors, and perhaps their own
professional careers. The influence of each respective factor on the board’s decision
will depend to some extent on the governing law, 54 but likely also will be driven in
some part by the parties at the negotiating table.
Notably, existing best practices treat these two scenarios very differently. Many
corporations will utilize independent board committees or special approval procedures for interested party transactions to mitigate the influence of external factors in
the first scenario.55 Such protective measures are not the norm, however, in the second scenario. Yet directors in the second scenario may face significantly more pressure from particular interest groups, increased opportunities for conflicts of interest
and self-dealing, and arguments that some duties are owed to creditors if the company is in fact insolvent. The next section considers these competing factors and their
potential consequences for the company and its shareholders.
B. Additional Challenges for a Board of a Distressed Company
A company experiencing financial distress can invoke a number of alternatives to
ameliorate its distress and return to profitability. 56 It can implement operational
changes that reduce costs and streamline production or the provision of services. It
can sell noncore assets or pursue strategic partners. It also can explore balance sheet

53. See id. at 1056 (“The principal threats to outside directors . . . are the time, aggravation, and potential harm to reputation that a lawsuit can entail . . . .”).
54. Although many states have statutes that permit boards to consider the interests of
stakeholders other than shareholders in making decisions, commentators debate the impact of
these statutes (and, notably, Delaware does not have a constituency statute). See, e.g., ANDREW
KEAY, THE ENLIGHTENED SHAREHOLDER VALUE PRINCIPLE AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
195–99 (2013); Leo E. Strine, Jr., The Dangers of Denial: The Need for a Clear-Eyed
Understanding of the Power and Accountability Structure Established by the Delaware
General Corporation Law, 50 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 761 (2015); see also supra note 40 (discussing directors’ duties in the context of insolvency).
55. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(c) (2011); Scott V. Simpson & Katherine
Brody, The Evolving Role of Special Committees in M&A Transactions: Seeking Business
Judgment Rule Protection in the Context of Controlling Shareholder Transactions and Other
Corporate Transactions Involving Conflicts of Interest, 69 BUS. LAW. 1117 (2014).
56. See generally NAVIGATING TODAY’S ENVIRONMENT: THE DIRECTORS’ AND OFFICERS’
GUIDE TO RESTRUCTURING (John Wm. (“Jack”) Butler, Jr. ed., 2010) (reviewing frequent
causes of distress and alternatives for resolving it).
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adjustments to enhance liquidity or obtain additional financing until the underlying
source of the distress is resolved. Financing alternatives can include a new debt or
equity offering, an out-of-court workout with existing lenders, a refinancing with
new lenders, or an in-court reorganization under chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code.57
In any event, the board of a distressed company must make difficult choices. The
board must, for example, weigh the interests of creditors and shareholders. Financial
distress exemplifies the traditional conflict between creditors and shareholders, with
creditors often desiring a more conservative course sufficient to pay off the debt and
shareholders often wanting more aggressive action resulting in debt repayment and
equity value for shareholders.58 The board also likely will consider the interests of
the company’s employees and the company’s relationships with suppliers and communities.59 The one alternative that in theory could satisfy all of these competing
interests—that is, resolving the company’s financial distress out-of-court through a
workout or refinancing that does not require significant closures or layoffs—may not
be attainable. Nevertheless, a board may pursue such an alternative at all costs.
In such steadfast pursuit, a board may be justified in its approach, or it may be
blinded by heuristics, denial, or the influence of a particular constituent. 60 For example, a board and the officers may believe that they have the talent and experience to
turn around the company’s financial situation if simply given enough time. 61 They
may be committed to a particular course of action that they designed and implemented.62 They may not recognize the severity of the company’s financial
condition.63 Notably, some or all of these and similar conditions may cause a board

57. See Michelle M. Harner, The Corporate Governance and Public Policy Implications
of Activist Distressed Debt Investing, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 703, 728–41 (2008) (reviewing
each alternative for resolving financial distress by exploring the rights of debtholders in distressed situations).
58. See Rutheford B. Campbell, Jr. & Christopher W. Frost, Managers’ Fiduciary Duties
in Financially Distressed Corporations: Chaos in Delaware (and Elsewhere), 32 J. CORP. L.
491, 514 (2007) (“Once a corporation issues debt, shareholders have an incentive to overinvest in risky projects, while creditors have an incentive to avoid risk. Because shareholders,
as residual claimants, share the risk of loss with creditors but reap the gains from success, they
have an appetite for risk that increases with leverage.”); see also Michael C. Jensen & William
H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership
Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305 (1976) (discussing shareholder-bondholder conflict generally).
59. See supra note 54 and accompanying text.
60. See supra note 44.
61. See, e.g., Hersh Shefrin, Behavioral Corporate Finance, J. APPLIED CORP. FIN., Fall
2001, at 113, 117–18 (discussing overconfidence bias and poor corporate decision making);
Dan Lovallo & Daniel Kahneman, Delusions of Success: How Optimism Undermines
Executives’ Decisions, HARV. BUS. REV., July 2003, at 56, 58 (discussing impact of cognitive
biases on business decisions).
62. See Ian Weinstein, Don’t Believe Everything You Think: Cognitive Bias in Legal
Decision Making, 9 CLINICAL L. REV. 783, 796–97 (2003) (discussing framing or anchoring
bias as “the tendency to view a given problem in different terms depending on the perspective
from which the problem is viewed”).
63. See Harner & Griffin, supra note 36, at 208 (explaining that “[o]strich syndrome refers to management’s tendency to stick its collective head in the sand and ignore the warning
signs of financial distress until it is too late to effectively resolve that distress.”).
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to back the company into a negotiating corner with lenders, creating a “win-win”
situation for the lender and a “partial win-complete loss” situation for the company
and its stakeholders.
Why do these conditions create a win-win for the lenders only? It boils down to
basic negotiating theory: the lenders have something that the board desperately wants
and will give most anything to get; the board also likely has little to offer the lenders
in return.64 The result often is a workout or new financing package that stacks the
deck in favor of the lenders, with extremely tight covenants for the company and
veto rights for the lenders. If the company is able to use the financing to resolve the
underlying distress, everyone wins, including the lenders, who will be repaid in full
at extremely high rates. If the company is unsuccessful, the lenders still win, but in
this scenario they do not share the victory. The lenders likely will be able to take over
the company and either continue to run it for their own benefit (after downsizing or
fixing any operational issues), sell it as a going concern (typically at a large profit),
or foreclose on the assets for a recovery to the exclusion of all other stakeholders. 65
From the lenders’ perspective, the win-win scenario described above is fair and
equitable, as all parties are getting exactly what they bargained for. Indeed, the
lenders generally are entitled to the benefit of their bargain. From the company’s
perspective, a win for the lenders only likely means a loss—perhaps significant
losses—for the company’s other stakeholders. In particular, the company’s existing
shareholders will be wiped out, existing creditors (other than the winning lenders)
will receive little if any recovery on their claims, and many (if not all) of the company’s employees will be laid off.66 Absent fraud or misconduct, these losses are not

64. See Robert S. Adler & Elliot M. Silverstein, When David Meets Goliath: Dealing with
Power Differentials in Negotiations, 5 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 1, 19 (2000) (“In most relationships, power flows from the more dependent to the less dependent party.”). For a general discussion of negotiating leverage in transactional settings, see DAVID A. LAX & JAMES K.
SEBENIUS, THE MANAGER AS NEGOTIATOR: BARGAINING FOR COOPERATION AND COMPETITIVE
GAIN (1986).
65. This strategy often is referred to as a loan-to-own situation, in which the lender’s primary objective is “controlling and owning the reorganized company upon the debtor’s emergence from bankruptcy.” Michelle M. Harner, Paul E. Harner, Catherine M. Martin & Aaron
M. Singer, Distressed Debt Investing, in ALTERNATIVE INVESTMENTS: INSTRUMENTS,
PERFORMANCE, BENCHMARKS, AND STRATEGIES 303, 306–08 (H. Kent Baker & Greg Filbeck
eds., 2013) (exploring investment strategies with respect to distressed companies); see also
Harner, supra note 57, at 714 (explaining loan-to-own investment strategy).
66. In a bankruptcy case or out-of-court liquidation scenario, creditors are generally paid
according to federal bankruptcy law or state law priorities, which pays secured creditors first,
followed by general unsecured creditors, followed last by equity holders. There are frequently
multiple tranches of creditors within each general category, and each class of creditors must
be paid in full before a lower class can receive any distributions. Consequently, in many instances, unsecured creditors receive nominal recoveries and equity holders receive nothing. In
addition, employees lose their jobs and trade creditors lose business. See, e.g., Circuit City
Unplugged: Why Did Chapter 11 Fail To Save 34,000 Jobs?: Hearing Before the Subcomm.
on Commercial and Admin. Law of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong., 2 (2009)
(statement of Steve Cohen, Chairman, Subcomm. on Commercial and Administrative Law)
(“Before [its bankruptcy] filing, Circuit City was one of the Nation's largest retailers, with
more than 700 store locations, and more than 34,000 employees. In less than 4 months after
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the fault of the winning lenders; these losses are the risk for which the company
bargained. The crux of the issue thus lies in the bargain itself. It also suggests that
the board and officers need additional information and assistance in making preinsolvency decisions.
This suggestion does not mean that boards are incapable of serving the corporation’s interests. Many boards are very effective, and most directors work hard to try
to get it right. The corporate governance landscape is, however, complicated. Particularly as a company approaches distress, directors are called upon to separate noise
from substance. The presence of activists can blur this distinction. Accordingly, the
Article next analyzes the role of activists before evaluating tools to improve board
decisions.
II. CONFOUNDING FACTORS: ACTIVIST SHAREHOLDERS AND DEBTHOLDERS
Historically, corporate activism has had a negative connotation and has been most
frequently associated with corporate raiders and vultures.67 “Activists” are viewed as
threats to existing management with an interest only in short-term profitability and
self-benefiting transactions. The corporate raiders of the 1980s often are held up as
the face of activism, and “greed is good” is thrown out as its slogan.68
Although there is undoubtedly some truth to that notion, activists are not a monolithic group, and some of their tactics may work to benefit not only themselves, but
also other corporate stakeholders. This Part examines the role of shareholder and
debtholder activists in corporate America and concludes with a detailed case study
of each.
A. Shareholder Activism
Most shareholders, particularly those owning stock in larger corporations, are passive investors.69 They make a fixed monetary investment when they purchase their

filing for Chapter 11, however, Circuit City closed all of its doors, and virtually all of its employees are now without jobs, jobless.”); see also id. at 8 (testimony of Harvey R. Miller, Weil,
Gotschal & Manges, LLP); David R. Jury, Assoc. Gen. Counsel, United Steelworkers, Written
Statement Submitted to the ABI Commission to Study the Reform of Chapter 11: Field
Hearing at the American College of Bankruptcy, 1 (Mar. 14, 2013) (statement available at
http://commission.abi.org/field-hearing-acb-thursday-march-14 [https://perma.cc/7E9F-7R4Q])
(“Between 1998 and 2003, the domestic steel industry experienced a crisis brought on by a
tide of imports which flooded the market and drove steel prices down to 20-year lows. The
result was 44 bankruptcies, 18 liquidations and the loss of 55,000 jobs.”).
67. For a general discussion of the characterization of activists as raiders, see Nicole M.
Boyson & Robert M. Mooradian, Corporate Governance and Hedge Fund Activism, 14 REV.
DERIVATIVES RES. 169 (2011); Michelle M. Harner, Activist Distressed Debtholders: The New
Barbarians at the Gate, 89 WASH. U. L. REV. 155, 164–67 (2011).
68. See generally ROBERT SLATER, THE TITANS OF TAKEOVER (Beard Books 1999) (1987)
(analyzing transactions pursued by activists in 1980s); Stuart L. Gillan & Laura T. Starks,
Corporate Governance Proposals and Shareholder Activism: The Role of Institutional
Investors, 57 J. FIN. ECON. 275 (2000) (reviewing literature on activist transactions in 1980s).
69. For an interesting commentary on the performance of activist versus passive shareholders in 2014, see Stephen Gandel, Passive Investors Crushed the Activists in 2014,
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stock, and they then rely on the corporation’s board and officers, and perhaps other
investors, to manage and grow the value of their investment. Moreover, many shareholders hold stock in larger corporations through mutual funds or other third-party
managed investment vehicles, thereby further removing them from active management of the company.70 This passive investor model exacerbates the agency costs
associated with the American model of the corporation (i.e., separation of ownership
and management).71
Not all shareholders, however, are passive investors. Some shareholders strategically invest in companies where they perceive a need for change. 72 That change may
involve replacing management or the board, pursuing acquisitions or asset dispositions, restructuring operations, or encouraging the company to adopt other measures
that arguably would unlock value if implemented correctly. Although some such
changes could improve the value of the company over the longer term, many changes
have a shorter-term focus.73
For example, some activist investors call upon boards to use cash reserves to repurchase stock or make larger dividend payments to shareholders. 74 This move

FORTUNE (Jan. 9, 2015, 11:21 AM), http://fortune.com/2015/01/09/activist-investors-performance
-2014/ [https://perma.cc/P85Q-NGPX] (“If you put your money in the S&P 500 and let it sit
there for the entirety of 2014, your portfolio would have gone up 12%. No proxy fights
needed.”).
70. See Commissioner Luis A. Aguilar, U.S. Sec. and Exch. Comm’n, Institutional
Investors: Power and Responsibility (Apr. 19, 2013) (transcript available at http://www.sec.gov
/News/Speech/Detail/Speech/1365171515808 [https://perma.cc/578V-8FR6]) (“For example,
the proportion of U.S. public equities managed by institutions has risen steadily over the past
six decades, from about 7 or 8% of market capitalization in 1950, to about 67% in 2010. The
shift has come as more American families participate in the capital markets through pooledinvestment vehicles, such as mutual funds and exchange traded funds (ETFs).” (footnotes
omitted)).
71. See supra notes 32–35 and accompanying text.
72. For a general overview of strategies pursued by activist shareholders, see Lucian A.
Bebchuk, Alon Brav & Wei Jiang, The Long-Term Effects of Hedge Fund Activism, 115
COLUM. L. REV. 1085 (2015); Alon Brav, Wei Jiang, Frank Partnoy & Randall Thomas, Hedge
Fund Activism, Corporate Governance, and Firm Performance, 63 J. FIN. 1729 (2008); Brian
R. Cheffins & John Armour, The Past, Present, and Future of Shareholder Activism by Hedge
Funds, 37 J. CORP. L. 51, 58–59 (2011). See also ACTIVIST INSIGHT, ACTIVIST INVESTING: AN
ANNUAL REVIEW OF TRENDS IN SHAREHOLDER ACTIVISM 10–12 (2015) (“Demands for board
change have long accounted for the lion’s share of activist campaigns, with M&A-related activity a close second. But a spike in balance-sheet activism in 2013 had returned to normal in
2014, with activists diversifying their objectives to include other governance and more business strategy demands.”).
73. For an example of the debate concerning the impact of activist shareholders and shorttermism, compare Lucian A. Bebchuk, The Myth that Insulating Boards Serves Long-Term
Value, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 1637 (2013), with Leo E. Strine, Jr., Can We Do Better by
Ordinary Investors? A Pragmatic Reaction to the Dueling Ideological Mythologists of
Corporate Law, 114 COLUM L. REV. 449 (2014).
74. See, e.g., Vipal Monga, David Benoit & Theo Francis, As Activism Rises, U.S. Firms
Spend More on Buybacks than Factories, WALL ST. J. (May 26, 2015, 10:30 PM), http://
www.wsj.com/articles/companies-send-more-cash-back-to-shareholders-1432693805 [https://perma.cc
/EU4B-4H2E].
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pushes value out to shareholders, but may do so at the expense of the company’s
longer-term interests—for example, the company accordingly may invest less in research and development, or in maintenance and upgrade initiatives. The company’s
cash reserves also may ultimately prove insufficient to sustain the company through
an economic downturn or other unforeseen event. Moody’s has warned bondholders
that such uses of a company’s cash may weaken the company’s longer-term prospects and, consequently, its ratings. 75
Activist investors also analyze a board’s operational decisions, from the selection
of director candidates to how the company makes its products. For example, Elliott
Management sent a letter to the board of Citrix Systems suggesting a new plan for
operational and managerial improvements.76 This letter stated in part:
Today, Elliott is formally requesting a meeting with the Board to
share the details of an operational plan that we believe will create tremendous value for stockholders. What we call the “New Citrix”
Operating Plan (the “New Citrix Plan”) was developed through exhaustive research and with the help of a full team of operating partners with
proven experience turning around software companies . . . .
....
The New Citrix Plan is based upon two driving principles: the need
for i) fundamental change and ii) effective oversight. The key components for fundamental change are as follows:
1) Implementation of Operational Best Practices: Citrix’s cost
structure is the result of years of layered complexity and expenses. The
structure has become highly inefficient in terms of actual cost and is also
ineffective at generating revenue growth. We have identified numerous
opportunities throughout the organization for significant improvement,
which we believe will result in both superior revenue performance and a
more efficient use of resources.77
The letter identified product management as one such opportunity for operational
improvement: “Citrix’s product portfolio is too broad for its scale and contains far
too many underperforming product lines that consume valuable resources, have low
or negative (i.e., loss-making) return profiles, and serve as distractions.” 78 Citrix’s
stock price rose after Elliott announced its 7.1% ownership stake and its communications with the Citrix board.79

75. Announcement, Moody’s Investor Servs., Moody’s: Activist Shareholders Gain
Momentum in 2015; Mainly Negative for Credit Investors (Apr. 9, 2015), https://www.moodys
.com/research/Moodys-Activist-shareholders-gain-momentum-in-2015-mainly-negative-for--PR_322629
[https://perma.cc/TCE5-H68R] (“In many cases, shareholder activists pursue short-term initiatives like share buybacks or special dividends, which have negative implications for credit
investors.”); see also Monga et al., supra note 74.
76. Elliott Sends Letter to Citrix Board of Directors, BUS. WIRE (June 11, 2015, 8:38 AM),
http://www.businesswire.com/news/home/20150611005626/en/Elliott-Sends-Letter-Citrix-Board
-Directors#.VZ6jkmCIVFI [https://perma.cc/LRZ5-CSPL].
77. Id. (emphasis in original).
78. Id.
79. See Tiernan Ray, Citrix Surges 7%: Price Targets Zoom as Activists Elliott Call for
Change, BARRON’S: TECH TRADER DAILY (June 11, 2015, 12:07 PM), http://blogs.barrons.com
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Activism that evaluates and questions a board’s decisions may provide valuable
oversight and discipline. For this reason, some commentators herald activism as a
necessary and meaningful check on management that enhances management’s accountability.80 Others perceive activism as a channel for shareholder engagement
with management. As SEC Chair Mary Jo White observed in her comments on activism: “Increasingly, companies are talking to their shareholders, including socalled activist ones. That, in my view, is generally a very good thing. Increased
engagement is important and a growing necessity for many companies today.” 81 Academic studies also suggest that activism can enhance shareholder value. 82
Not all commentators agree, however, that shareholder activists are a positive influence on corporate boards.83 These commentators raise concerns regarding, among
other things, activists’ motivation and their typical focus on short-term returns.84 The
potential misalignment among the interests of the activist, other shareholders, and
the corporate entity does undercut any generalization about constructive activism.
Nevertheless, as discussed below in Part III, with appropriate safeguards, activism
may circumstantially work to serve the interests of the corporation.

/techtraderdaily/2015/06/11/citrix-surges-7-price-targets-zoom-as-activists-elliott-call-for-change/
[https://perma.cc/9MJX-KA9C]. Citrix responded to Elliott’s letter with the following
statement:
Citrix has always maintained an ongoing dialogue with our shareholders, and we
welcome their input. We will review Elliott’s suggestions and respond as we do
with all shareholders who engage with us. The Citrix Board and management
team continually evaluate ideas to drive shareholder value and are committed to
acting in the best interests of all our shareholders.
Press Release, Citrix Comments on Letter from Elliott Management (June 11, 2015), http://
investors.citrix.com/releasedetail.cfm?ReleaseID=917612 [https://perma.cc/ZAX4-A8J6].
80. See supra note 72.
81. Chair Mary Jo White, U.S. Sec. and Exch. Comm’n, A Few Observations on
Shareholders in 2015 (Mar. 19, 2015) (transcript available at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech
/observations-on-shareholders-2015.html [https://perma.cc/3U4H-YZF8]) (citation omitted).
82. See supra note 72; see also Alon Brav, Wei Jiang & Hyunseob Kim, Hedge Fund
Activism: A Review, 4 FOUND. & TRENDS FIN. 185 (2009) (reviewing literature). For a general
description of data showing a short-termism effect, see Mark J. Roe, Corporate ShortTermism—In the Boardroom and in the Courtroom, 68 BUS. LAW. 977 (2013).
83. See, e.g., Lynne L. Dallas, Short-Termism, the Financial Crisis, and Corporate
Governance, 37 J. CORP. L. 265 (2012); P. Alexander Quimby, Note, Addressing Corporate
Short-Termism Through Loyalty Shares, 40 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 389 (2013); Martin Lipton,
Bite the Apple; Poison the Apple; Paralyze the Company; Wreck the Economy, HARV. L. SCH.:
F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (Feb. 26, 2013), http://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2013/02/26
/bite-the-apple-poison-the-apple-paralyze-the-company-wreck-the-economy/ [https://perma.cc/7TWB-KLGE];
see also Roe, supra note 82, at 987–91 (reviewing literature on short-termism and offering
theoretical and factual counterarguments).
84. See, e.g., Leo E. Strine, Jr., One Fundamental Corporate Governance Question We
Face: Can Corporations Be Managed for the Long Term Unless Their Powerful Electorates
Also Act and Think Long Term?, 66 BUS. LAW. 1, 26 (2010).
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B. Debtholder Activism
Investors not only pursue activist agendas as shareholders, but also as debtholders.85 In addition, an investor may hold both stock and debt and use that
multitranche investment to further its activist interests and influence over the company.86 An activist debtholder typically has the greatest leverage once the target company starts to experience financial distress or some kind of liquidity event. In those
instances, the debtholder can try to extract governance or transactional concessions
from the board in exchange for a forbearance agreement or restructuring of the underlying debt.87
One common activist-debtholder strategy is the “loan-to-own” situation.88 An investor will extend new or additional credit to (or agree to restructure its existing
credit with) a company in exchange for covenants in the loan documents that provide
the investor with indirect control over decisions such as whether the company can
sell assets, pay certain other debt obligations, incur additional obligations, or file a
bankruptcy case. The financial covenants also are set fairly tight, giving the company
a chance—but not too great of a chance—of meeting its restructuring objectives. The
failure of the company to do so basically turns over control of the company and
ownership of the assets to the activist debtholder.
A loan-to-own strategy can be effected inside or outside of a chapter 11 bankruptcy case. For example, in 2012, Aventine Renewable Energy Holdings, Inc.—an
ethanol producer in the Midwest—defaulted on its loan obligations and, after receiving a short forbearance agreement from its lenders, initiated a debt-for-equity exchange with its lenders to resolve the default. 89 The lenders received 92.5 % of the

85. See Harner, supra note 57 , at 750–54 (explaining activist-debtholder strategies); see
also, e.g., Kenneth M. Ayotte & Edward R. Morrison, Creditor Control and Conflict in
Chapter 11, 1 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 511 (2009); Casey & Henderson, supra note 42, at 376–83
(discussing creditor influence on firm governance); Michelle M. Harner, Jamie Marincic
Griffin & Jennifer Ivey-Crickenberger, Activist Investors, Distressed Companies, and Value
Uncertainty, 22 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 167 (2014) (detailing an empirical study of the role
of hedge fund investors in distressed debt and reviewing strategies and potential impact of
such funds); Frederick Tung, Leverage in the Board Room: The Unsung Influence of Private
Lenders in Corporate Governance, 57 UCLA L. REV. 115 passim (2009) (discussing creditor
influence on firm governance).
86. See infra Part II.D (RadioShack case study); see also Harner, supra note 67, at 162–
63 (providing examples of such investment strategies).
87. See Harner, supra note 57, at 712–18 (explaining strategies of activist debtholders).
88. See Harner, supra note 67, at 165–69 (providing examples of a loan-to-own strategy).
89. See Press Release, Aventine Renewable Energy Holdings, Inc., Aventine Renewable
Energy Holdings, Inc. Enters into a Significant Restructuring Transaction with Members of
Its Lender Group (Aug. 20, 2012), http://globenewswire.com/news-release/2012/08/20/483287
/10002526/en/Aventine-Renewable-Energy-Holdings-Inc-Enters-Into-a-Significant-Restructuring
-Transaction-With-Members-of-Its-Lender-Group.html
[https://perma.cc/B7G6-2VM8];
S&P Glob. Mkt. Intelligence, Aventine Lenders Take Over Distressed Company in Out-ofCourt Restructuring, LEVERAGEDLOAN.COM, (Aug. 21, 2012, 3:39 PM), http://www
.leveragedloan.com/aventine-lenders-take-over-distressed-company-in-out-of-court-restructuring/
[https://perma.cc/3SSF-F6L4].
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company’s stock, with the remaining equity held by preexisting shareholders.90
Aventine’s lenders included several hedge funds and private equity firms.91 The CEO
appointed by the lenders after the change in the ownership was a consultant to several
private equity firms, with extensive turnaround experience.92 In July 2015 Aventine
merged with Pacific Ethanol, an ethanol producer in the western United States.93
Alternatively, lenders can extend postbankruptcy (a.k.a. debtor in possession)
financing to the company to fund a chapter 11 case designed to sell the company to
the lenders under § 363 of the Bankruptcy Code.94 A § 363 sale can be accomplished
fairly quickly under existing law, and lenders can acquire exceptionally clean title to
the assets through a sale free and clear of all liens and encumbrances under § 363(f)
of the Bankruptcy Code.95 The potential downside to this strategy under chapter 11

90. See S&P Glob. Mkt. Intelligence, supra note 89.
91. Id.
92. The biography of Mark Beemer, former CEO of Aventine Renewable, explained that
“Beemer is an advisor to numerous private equity firms in the ethanol space; he is a member
of the Turnaround Management Association, the RFA, and the National Grain and Feed
Association.” Management Team, AVENTINE RENEWABLE ENERGY, INC., http://www.aventinerei
.com/en/about/management_team/ [https://web.archive.org/web/20140306172410/http://www
.aventinerei.com/en/about/management_team/].
93. See Press Release, Pacific Ethanol, Inc., Pacific Ethanol Completes Aventine Merger
(July 1, 2015), https://globenewswire.com/news-release/2015/07/01/749050/10140324/en
/Pacific-Ethanol-Completes-Aventine-Merger.html [https://perma.cc/7TJR-6NBB]; Press
Release, Pacific Ethanol, Inc., Stockholders Approve Merger of Pacific Ethanol and Aventine
(June 11, 2015), https://globenewswire.com/news-release/2015/06/11/744031/10138242/en
/Stockholders-Approve-Merger-of-Pacific-Ethanol-and-Aventine.html [https://perma.cc
/29RS-R3TP].
94. Section 364 of the Bankruptcy Code permits a debtor, with court approval, to provide
certain protections to lenders extending credit to the debtor postpetition. 11 U.S.C. § 364
(2012). Accordingly, lenders often have an incentive to extend such credit. See David A. Skeel,
Jr., The Past, Present and Future of Debtor-in-Possession Financing, 25 CARDOZO L. REV.
1905, 1906 (2004) (“[T]he generous terms offered to DIP financers have encouraged lenders
to make loans to cash-starved debtors, and that these lenders have used their leverage to fill a
governance vacuum that was created by the enactment of the 1978 Code.”). This postpetition
financing also may be necessary to fund the debtor’s chapter 11 case to the point of a sale of
the company in the case. In fact, the terms of the postpetition facility may require such a sale.
95. 11 U.S.C. § 363(b), (f) (2012) (authorizing asset sales out of the ordinary course of
business and free and clear of any liens and interests in such assets, respectively, under certain
circumstances). Under Bankruptcy Rule 2002(a)(2), a debtor typically must provide twentyone days’ notice by mail of “a proposed use, sale, or lease of property of the estate other than
in the ordinary course of business, unless the court for cause shown shortens the time or directs
another method of giving notice.” FED. R. BANKR. P. 2002(a)(2). Nevertheless, courts may
approve proposed asset sales on a much quicker basis. See, e.g., Order Under 11 U.S.C.
§§ 105(a), 363, and 365 and Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure 2002, 6004 and 6006
Authorizing and Approving (A) the Sale of Purchased Assets Free and Clear of Liens and
Other Interests and (B) Assumption and Assignment of Executory Contracts and Unexpired
Leases, In re Lehman Bros. Holdings Inc., No. 08-13555 (JMP), (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Sept. 19,
2008), 2008 WL 4385983 (sale approved within seven days of petition date); Melissa B.
Jacoby & Edward J. Janger, Ice Cube Bonds: Allocating the Price of Process in Chapter 11
Bankruptcy, 123 YALE L.J. 862 (2014) (discussing issues with quick asset sales in bankruptcy).
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is that most bankruptcy courts require the company to subject the lenders’ bid, which
frequently is a credit bid of the amount owed by the company under the loan documents, to a public auction process. For example, an affiliate of Silver Point Capital,
which was pursuing a loan-to-own strategy and was the stalking horse bidder in a
chapter 11 sale process,96 lost its attempt to acquire print company Standard Register
Co. Silver Point’s credit bid was $275 million, and the winning bid, submitted by the
Taylor Company, was $307 million.97
Similar to shareholder activism, commentators debate the utility of debtholder
proactivity.98 Debtholder activism that identifies and replaces ineffective or fraudulent management or helps management recognize the advantages of rightsizing the
company’s operations through a restructuring may add value for the corporate entity.
Debtholder activism that is pursued, however, solely for the economic interests of
the activist may significantly undervalue the company or dismantle a company with
other viable restructuring alternatives, provided that the company was given sufficient time to restructure. These risks exist because a debtholder looking to buy the
company wants to pay as little as possible, which frequently results in a low valuation
that wipes out all junior creditors and shareholders. 99 Likewise, a debtholder that

96. See Debtors’ Motion for (I) an Order (A) Establishing Sale Procedures Relating to the
Sale of Substantially All of the Debtors’ Assets; (B) Approving Bid Protections; (C) Establishing Procedures Relating to the Assumption and Assignment of Certain Executory Contracts and Unexpired Leases, Including Notice of Proposed Cure Amounts; (D) Approving
Form and Manner of Notice of All Procedures, Protections, Schedules, and Agreements;
(E) Scheduling a Hearing to Consider the Proposed Sale; and (F) Granting Certain Related
Relief; and (II) and Order (A) Approving the Sale of Substantially All of the Debtors’ Assets
and (B) Authorizing the Assumption and Assignment of Certain Executory Contracts and Unexpired Leases in Connection With the Sale, In re Standard Register Company, No. 15-10541,
(Bankr. D. Del. Mar. 12) Doc. No. 23, 2015 WL 1440853; see also Peg Brickley, Standard
Register Files for Bankruptcy with Plans for Sale, WALL ST. J. (Mar. 12, 2015, 12:01 PM),
http://www.wsj.com/articles/standard-register-files-for-bankruptcy-with-plans-for-sale-1426164844
[https://perma.cc/X6JU-LD92].
97. See Order (I) Authorizing the Sale of Substantially All of the Debtors’ Assets Free
and Clear of All Liens, Claims, Encumbrances, and Interests; (II) Authorizing the Assumption
and Assignment of Certain Executory Contracts and Unexpired Leases; and (III) Granting
Certain Related Relief, In re Standard Register Company, No. 15-10541-BLS, (Bankr. D. Del.
June 19, 2015) Doc. No. 698; see also Randall Chase, Judge Set To OK Sale of Standard
Register to Taylor Corp., SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB. (June 17, 2015), http://www.sandiegounion
tribune.com/sdut-judge-set-to-ok-sale-of-standard-register-to-2015jun17-story.html [https://perma.cc
/CY3L-YAVH].
98. See, e.g., HILARY ROSENBERG, THE VULTURE INVESTORS (John Wiley & Sons, Inc.,
rev. ed. 2000) (1992); Bebchuk et al., supra note 72; Edith S. Hotchkiss & Robert M.
Mooradian, Vulture Investors and the Market for Control of Distressed Firms, 43 J. FIN. ECON.
401 (1997); Marcel Kahan & Edward Rock, Hedge Fund Activism in the Enforcement of
Bondholder Rights, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 281 (2009).
99. For example, an activist debtholder often will seek to purchase the company’s assets
in a going concern bankruptcy sale by credit bidding the amount of its debt claim against the
company. 11 U.S.C. § 363(k) (authorizing credit bidding by secured creditors). Unless the
activist debtholder is also willing to pay cash in amount above its debt claim, the company
will not have any cash or assets remaining after the sale to pay the claims of junior creditors
or the interests of equity holders.
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wants to own the company for strategic reasons (e.g., to prevent competition with
another portfolio company or to capitalize on synergies with a certain aspect of the
target company’s business) may not only undervalue the company, but also significantly affect the company’s employee and vendor relationships.
The following section details two different situations involving faltering companies and activist investors. These case studies illustrate the potential strengths and
weaknesses of activism in this context. They also inform the proposal made in this
Article to enhance the prospects of distressed companies and their stakeholders
through targeted proxy access.
C. Case Study: Darden Restaurants, Inc.
Darden Restaurants, Inc. traces its origins to Bill Darden, who opened his first
restaurant at the age of 19 in 1938.100 Since that time, the company has expanded and
contracted and changed ownership several times. Activist investors have influenced
at least some of these changes, particularly in recent years.
Darden’s expansion started with the success of its Red Lobster restaurants in the
1970s.101 In 1970, General Mills acquired the restaurant chain and, in 1982, introduced The Olive Garden.102 General Mills spun off Darden in 1995, with Darden
becoming an independent publicly traded company on the New York Stock
Exchange.103 Although Darden is most commonly associated with Red Lobster and
Olive Garden, Darden has owned (and in many instances continues to own) other
well-known niche restaurants, including Bahama Breeze, LongHorn Steakhouse,
Smokey Bones, The Capital Grille, and Yard House.104
Darden’s first major financial disappointment occurred in 1997, when the company recorded an annual loss of $91.03 million and closed fifty-five stores.105 This

100. Our History, DARDEN, http://www.darden.com/about/photo_history.asp [https://
web.archive.org/web/20150510060813/https://www.darden.com/about/photo_history.asp].
References to Darden before 1995 are to the business operations ultimately owned by Darden
after the 1995 spin-off. As described below, Darden, Inc. was not formed until 1995. Id.; see
also Gen. Mills Inc., Quarterly Report (Form 10-Q) (Apr. 8, 1996) (“During the fiscal year
ended May 28, 1995 the company spun off its restaurant operations as a separate, free-standing
company, Darden Restaurants, Inc.”).
101. Red Lobster opened in the late 1960s, but it did not expand significantly in popularity
and locations until the 1970s. See Darden Rest., Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K) (Aug. 16,
1996) (charting the dramatic rise of Red Lobster in the 1970s, from 6 restaurants in 1970 to
260 at the end of fiscal year 1980).
102. Id.
103. Our History, supra note 100; see Gen. Mills Inc., Quarterly Report (Form 10-Q) (Apr.
8, 1996).
104. Darden Rests., Inc., Quarterly Report (Form 10-Q) 10 (Mar. 30, 2015); see Mark
Chediak, Orlando-Based Darden Restaurants Sells Smokey Bones Chain to Private-Equity
Firm, ORLANDO SENTINEL (Dec. 5, 2007), http://articles.orlandosentinel.com/2007-12-05
/business/smokey05_1_smokey-bones-bones-barbeque-darden [https://perma.cc/3LZZ-D5ZR];
Our Brands, DARDEN RESTS., INC., https://www.darden.com/restaurants/our-brands
[https://perma.cc/4A6J-3BJ7].
105. Darden Rests., Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K) 15 (Aug. 15, 1997) (noting in
“Expansion Strategy” section that in fiscal year 1997, Darden closed thirty-nine Red Lobster
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setback was, however, temporary, and Darden was able to remedy most of the problem through operational improvements at its Red Lobster and Olive Garden restaurants.106 The company then experienced a period of continuous growth and increased
profits, with only minor interruptions, until late 2007.107
After that time, Darden struggled to meet investors’ and management’s expectations. Operational adjustments, such as opening new “combo” locations featuring
Red Lobster and Olive Garden, did not succeed,108 and expansion plans failed to
boost revenues.109 Darden entered a particularly tumultuous period in late 2012 and
2013.110 Darden reported a 37.6% drop in first-quarter profit in 2013 compared with

restaurants in the United States and Canada, and sixteen Olive Garden restaurants in the United
States).
106. Darden Rests., Inc., Current Report (Form 8-K) 5–6 (Sept. 25, 1998) (discussing in
Exhibit 99 press release that there was fifty percent growth in first quarter earnings and
double-digit increases in comparable restaurant sales).
107. The company acquired and sold various assets during this period in the hopes of increasing cash flows. See Rare Hospitality Sold to Orlando Company for $1.4 Billion, ATLANTA
BUS. CHRON. (Aug. 16, 2007, 6:20 PM), http://www.bizjournals.com/atlanta/stories/2007/08
/13/daily41.html?page=all [https://web.archive.org/web/20131207223941/http://www.bizjournals.com
/atlanta/stories/2007/08/13/daily41.html?page=all] (reporting that Darden had purchased Rare
Hospitality, adding LongHorn Steakhouse and Capital Grille to Darden’s line of restaurants);
see also Press Release, Darden Rests., Inc, Darden Restaurants Offers Barbecue Chain for
Sale, Better Positioning Casual Dining Leader for Future Growth (May 5, 2007), https://
s2.q4cdn.com/922937207/files/doc_news/news_2007/news_2007_general/DRI_News_2007_5_5
_General.pdf [https://perma.cc/8BBW-9H2B] (reporting that Darden elected to sell its Smokey
Bones chain of barbecue restaurants “as part of an overall effort by the company to better
position Darden for future growth”).
108. See Sandra Pedicini, Darden Restaurants Tests Combo Olive Garden/Red Lobster for
Smaller Markets, ORLANDO SENTINEL (Jan. 24, 2011), http://articles.orlandosentinel.com
/2011-01-24/business/os-hybrid-olive-garden-red-lobster-20110124_1_red-lobster-olive-garden
-darden-restaurants [https://perma.cc/NK3B-4MC2] (reporting that Darden was pairing its
two marquee brands in single-building locations in markets that could not support separate
locations for the two); see also Darden Rests., Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K) 1–2 (July 18,
2014) (describing these locations as “synergy restaurants” housing a Red Lobster and Olive
Garden in the same building and noting that of six “synergy restaurants,” two were closed in
anticipation of the sale of Red Lobster and the remaining four would be converted into Olive
Garden restaurants).
109. Darden also attempted to boost sales by adding two seafood chains to its lineup of
specialty restaurants in 2012. See Alan Snel, Darden Buys Two Seafood Brands, NATION’S
RESTAURANT NEWS (Oct. 13, 2011), http://nrn.com/archive/darden-buys-two-seafood-brands
[https://perma.cc/MVQ7-UWZY] (reporting that Darden “acquired two small seafood chains,
Eddie V’s Prime Seafood and Wildfish Seafood Grille, in a $59 million cash transaction”); see
also Darden Rests., Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K) 2 (July 18, 2014).
110. See Darden Rests., Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K) 21 (July 18, 2014) (describing
and anticipating the economic conditions that could interfere with performance). For example,
on the same day in September 2013 that the company announced weak first-quarter earnings,
the company also announced that it was cutting eighty-five jobs at its Orlando headquarters
and the retirement of its second-in-command, COO Drew Madsen. Sandra Pedicini, Darden
Restaurants Reducing 85 Corporate Positions; COO Drew Madsen Leaving, ORLANDO
SENTINEL (Sept. 20, 2013), http://articles.orlandosentinel.com/2013-09-20/business/os-darden
-layoffs-20130920_1_darden-restaurants-olive-garden-central-florida-restaurant-professor
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that same period in the previous year.111 Although analysts had expected earnings of
70–72 cents per share in the first-quarter of 2013, the actual mark was well below
that at 53 cents per share. 112 The company’s stock dropped 7% the day the news of
the weak earnings and job cuts broke and closed at $45.78 per share. 113 Notably,
although Darden’s bigger name brands struggled in the first quarter of 2013,
Darden’s specialty group out-performed them, showing a 0.5% rise in sales.114 This
likely fueled activist investors’ later calls for big-brand spinoffs.
In December 2013, Darden tried to calm investors’ unrest and calls for change with
a restructuring plan aimed at increasing shareholder value.115 The major prongs of
Darden’s plan included spinning off its Red Lobster brand and reducing new unit expansion.116 Darden was under continuing pressure from one of its shareholders, Barington Capital Group, to spin off its underperforming chains.117 News of the planned spinoff and worse-than-expected earnings drove the stock price down by 5% to $50.17.118
Shortly after the company’s announcement, another shareholder, Starboard
Values LP, came out against the Red Lobster spin-off.119 Starboard owned
approximately 6.2% of Darden’s stock at the time, 120 and it had been lobbying
Darden “to consider other options, such as splitting off its property as an independent
real estate investment trust.”121 Darden ignored Starboard’s suggestions, even though

[https://perma.cc/93D5-KG6F]; see also Darden Rests., Inc., Current Report (Form 8-K) 2
(Sept. 20, 2013, 7:35:45 AM).
111. Pedicini, supra note 110; see also Darden Rests., Inc., Quarterly Report (Form 10-Q)
20 (Sept. 30, 2013).
112. Pedicini, supra note 110; see also Darden Rests., Inc., Quarterly Report (Form 10-Q)
20 (Sept. 30, 2013).
113. Pedicini, supra note 110.
114. Id.; Darden Rests., Inc., Exhibit 99 (Form 8-K) 1–2 (Sept. 20, 2013, 7:34:25 AM)
(providing a press release on first-quarter sales from Darden’s specialty restaurants reporting
“same-restaurant sales increases of 3.2% at The Capital Grille, 2.7% at Bahama Breeze, and
2.1% at Eddie V’s, offset partially by declines of 4.4% at Seasons 52 and 1.5% at Yard
House”).
115. See Press Release, Darden Rests., Inc., Darden Announces Comprehensive Plan To
Enhance Shareholder Value, (Dec. 19, 2013), https://investor.darden.com/investors/press-releases
/press-release-details/2013/Darden-Announces-Comprehensive-Plan-to-Enhance-Shareholder-Value
/default.aspx [https://perma.cc/M4ER-9E45]; see also Darden Rests., Inc., Exhibit 99.1 (Form
8-K) (Dec. 19, 2013, 9:54:42 AM).
116. See Darden Rests., Inc., Exhibit 99.2 (Form 8-K) 1 (Dec. 19, 2013, 7:10:12 AM).
117. See David Benoit, Darden’s Red Lobster Split Gets Messy Reaction, WALL ST. J.:
MONEYBEAT (Dec. 19, 2013, 2:13 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/moneybeat/2013/12/19/dardens
-red-lobster-split-gets-messy-reaction/ [https://perma.cc/BN48-BYGA]. Barington also suggested that Darden should spin off Olive Garden. Id.
118. Id.
119. Samantha Sharf, Activists Turn Up Heat on Darden: Red Lobster Deal
‘Unconscionable,’ Board ‘Misleading,’ FORBES (May 22, 2014, 11:30 AM), http://www.forbes
.com/sites/samanthasharf/2014/05/22/activists-turn-up-heat-on-darden-red-lobster-deal
-unconscionable-board-misleading/ [https://perma.cc/99PD-AS2R]; see also Darden Rests.,
Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K) 14–15 (July 18, 2014).
120. See Sharf, supra note 119.
121. Nick Turner, Darden Activist Investor Starts Board Fight over Red Lobster,
BLOOMBERG (May 22, 2014, 4:12 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2014-05-22
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Barington ultimately supported Starboard’s request for a shareholder vote on the
proposed spin-off.122 Darden spun off Red Lobster without a shareholder meeting or
vote.123 Starboard ultimately pursued and won a proxy battle to take over Darden’s
board by nominating a slate of directors to replace all twelve members.124
To support its proxy contest, Starboard produced a 294-slide presentation that
walked shareholders through Darden’s missteps, both financial and operational, and
offered concrete solutions to improve the company’s performance.125 For example,
two slides, titled “Breadsticks: just one example of food waste,” explained how Olive
Garden’s practice of serving its unlimited breadsticks in excessive quantities beyond
the customers’ requests or needs reduced margins and profitability.126 Another slide
then suggested the consequences:

/darden-investor-starboard-starts-proxy-battle-over-red-lobster.html [https://perma.cc/2QV2
-L8ED]. Starboard asserted that Darden was selling Red Lobster for just $100 million more
than the value of the chain’s real estate, which could be sold tax-free. Darden disagreed with
Starboard’s analysis, asserting that the proposed sale would generate about $1.6 billion in
proceeds. Darden planned to use $1 billion of the proceeds to retire debt and the remainder to
fund a share buyback program of as much as $700 million. See Sharf, supra note 119; see also
Darden Rests., Inc., Exhibit 99.2 (Form DEFA14A) (Sept. 16, 2014, 4:48:53 PM) (providing
a presentation discussing Starboard’s proposal).
122. See Press Release, Barington Capital Grp., L.P., Barington Group Sends Letter to the
Independent Directors of Darden Restaurants, (Mar. 26, 2014), http://www.prnewswire.com
/news-releases/barington-group-sends-letter-to-the-independent-directors-of-darden-restaurants
-252430861.html [https://perma.cc/278R-S6AL].
123. See Press Release, Darden Rests., Inc., Darden Completes Sale of Red Lobster to
Golden Gate Capital, (July 28, 2014), https://investor.darden.com/investors/press-releases
/press-release-details/2014/Darden-Completes-Sale-Of-Red-Lobster-To-Golden-Gate-Capital
/default.aspx [https://perma.cc/AN4Q-BAVM]; see also Darden Rests., Inc., Current Report
(Form 8-K/A) (Aug. 1, 2014). In the midst of finalizing the sale, Darden announced that
Clarence Otis was stepping down as chairman and would only serve as CEO of Darden “until
the earlier of the appointment of his successor or December 31, 2014.” Press Release, Darden
Rests., Inc., Darden Announces Leadership Succession Plan (July 28, 2014), https://investor
.darden.com/investors/press-releases/press-release-details/2014/Darden-Announces-Leadership
-Succession-Plan/default.aspx [https://perma.cc/MGC7-G3CN]; see also Darden Rest., Inc.,
Current Report (Form 8-K) (July 29, 2014). This announcement appeared to be a move to try
to appease shareholders prior to the annual shareholders’ meeting.
124. See Turner, supra note 121; see also Darden Rests., Inc., Current Report (Form 8-K)
(Oct. 16, 2014).
125. Press Release, Starboard Value LP, Starboard Releases Detailed Transformation Plan
for Darden Restaurants (Sept. 12, 2014), http://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases
/starboard-releases-detailed-transformation-plan-for-darden-restaurants-274867301.html [https://
perma.cc/JS9Z-MT8M]; Starboard Value LP, Transforming Darden Restaurants (Sept. 11,
2014) [hereinafter Starboard Value, Transforming Darden], http://www.shareholderforum
.com/dri/Library/20140911_Starboard-presentation.pdf [https://perma.cc/LR5G-EARX].
Starboard compiled a similar presentation to contest Darden’s decision to sell Red Lobster.
See Starboard Value LP, Investor Presentation, Darden Restaurants, Inc. (Mar. 31, 2014)
[hereinafter Starboard Value, Investor Presentation], http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar
/data/940944/000092189514000699/ex991dfan14a06297125_033114.pdf [https://perma.cc
/U248-LPN2].
126. Starboard Value, Investor Presentation, supra note 125, at 104–05.
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Despite having far more stores than any of its peers, Darden does not
show economies of scale in food costs. In fact, Darden’s food costs are
near the highest in the industry. . . . We believe the primary driver of
Darden’s food cost problem is poor execution and discipline around food
waste, portion size, and preparation.127
Starboard ended the slide presentation with a summary of “Why Darden is compelling,” Starboard’s priorities, and its plan for the company.128
Although Darden reported losses for the second quarter of fiscal year 2015 (i.e.,
the first quarter following the board’s replacement), 129 it has consistently
outperformed since.130 Darden reported improved revenue and sales for the third and
fourth quarters131 and was identified as one of the “hottest dividend stocks of 2015.”132
D. Case Study: RadioShack Corp.
Similar to Darden, RadioShack has a long history dating back to 1921, when it
opened as a small shop in Boston. 133 The company initially focused on radios, expanding to other audio equipment in the 1950s and then to electronic calculators and
computers in the 1970s.134 RadioShack experienced financial distress early in its
lifecycle; in fact, the company was on the verge of bankruptcy when Tandy

127. Id. at 102 (emphasis omitted).
128. Id. at 286.
129. Darden Rests., Inc., Quarterly Report (Form 10-Q) 26 (Dec. 31, 2014) (announcing
second quarter results for fiscal year 2015).
130. See, e.g., Press Release, Darden Rests., Inc., Darden Restaurants Reports Fiscal 2017
First Quarter Results; Increases Earnings Outlook for the Full Fiscal Year; and Announces
New Share Repurchase Authorization (Oct. 4, 2016), https://investor.darden.com/investors
/press-releases/press-release-details/2016/Darden-Restaurants-Reports-Fiscal-2017-First-Quarter
-Results-Increases-Earnings-Outlook-For-The-Full-Fiscal-Year-And-Announces-New-Share
-Repurchase-Authorization/default.aspx [https://perma.cc/J32Y-VPKY] (“‘I’m pleased with
our performance during the quarter and the progress we made against our strategic initiatives,’
said CEO Gene Lee. ‘We continued to gain market share and our same-restaurant sales growth
outperformed the industry by a considerable margin. We also returned significant capital to
shareholders in the form of our regular dividend and $196 million in share repurchases.’”).
131. Darden Rests., Inc., Quarterly Report (Form 10-Q) 25 (Mar. 30, 2015); Darden Rests.,
Inc., Exhibit 99.1 (Form 8-K) 1 (June 23, 2015, 7:03:43 AM) (announcing fourth-quarter results in press release attached as Exhibit 99.1).
132. Dominic Chu, The Hottest Dividend Stocks of 2015, CNBC (Mar. 24, 2015, 2:58 PM),
http://www.cnbc.com/2015/03/24/the-hottest-dividend-stocks-of-2015.html [https://perma.cc
/DA4W-6UXU].
133. See, e.g., Joshua Brustein, Inside RadioShack’s Slow-Motion Collapse, BLOOMBERG
(Feb. 2, 2015), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/features/2015-02-02/inside-radioshack
-s-slow-motion-collapse [https://perma.cc/866M-WGCG]; RadioShack Corporation,
REFERENCE FOR BUS., http://www.referenceforbusiness.com/history2/8/RadioShack-Corporation.html
[https://perma.cc/3HWL-9WS9].
134. See Brustein, supra note 133; Alan Wolf, RadioShack: A Brief History of Time, TWICE
(Feb. 16, 2015, 8:00 AM), http://www.twice.com/news/retail/radioshack-brief-history-time
/56040 [https://perma.cc/7LJW-WLM5].
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Corp. purchased it in 1963.135 Tandy was able to turn around the company by
branding it as a “hobby store”—a place where you could purchase whatever you
needed to build the latest gadget. 136 The strategy was successful, and the company
grew from 100 stores in 1966 to over 1000 stores by 1971.137 It also started generating
a profit just two years after the Tandy acquisition. 138
For most of the 1970s and 1980s, RadioShack was the store for everything electronic. It was able to stay ahead of the curve and capture the market on new innovations such as the the CB radio, the personal computer, and the cellular phone. 139
RadioShack began to falter, however, in the 1990s, and it never really regained its
footing.
RadioShack’s management tried altering the company’s offerings and business
model to improve the company’s overall performance. By the late 1990s,
RadioShack stopped manufacturing personal computers and cellular phones, and it
began opening big-box type retail stores that each specialized in certain electronic
products.140 The concept stores experiment failed, and each was shuttered or sold by
the end of the 1990s.141
RadioShack’s permanent decline began in 2005, with significant management
turnover and increasing diminution in value. From 2005 to 2014, the company
experienced six changes at the CEO position, and its shares lost almost all of their
value.142 The company also experienced eleven consecutive quarters of losses before

135. See Brustein, supra note 133 Tandy was a leather company, which was trying to diversify in the 1960s. Tandy ultimately exited the leather industry in 1975 and focused on the
electronics side of the business. Tandy was publicly traded on the New York Stock Exchange,
and it changed its name to RadioShack in 2000, then trading under the symbol RSH. See A
Brief History of RadioShack, RADIOSHACKCATALOGS.COM, http://www.radioshackcatalogs.com
/history.html [https://perma.cc/3B2D-KABS].
136. See Brustein, supra note 133.
137. See id.
138. See RadioShack Corporation History, FUNDINGUNIVERSE http://www.fundinguniverse
.com/company-histories/radioshack-corporation-history/ [https://perma.cc/9XTP-VPEP]. See
generally Peter W. Barnes, Tandy’s Shifting Sales Strategy, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 19, 1984),
http://www.nytimes.com/1984/08/19/business/tandy-s-shifting-sales-strategy.html?pagewanted
=all [https://perma.cc/DR93-UTN3] (“In 1963 Mr. Tandy acquired nine ailing Radio Shack
stores, and in 20 years he catapulted them into an international chain of nearly 9,000 outlets.”);
Steven Davidoff Solomon, A History of Misses for RadioShack, N.Y. TIMES: DEALBOOK (Sept.
16, 2014, 2:35 PM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2014/09/16/for-radioshack-a-history-of-misses
/?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/CM2L-CKV8] (describing RadioShack’s various failures).
139. See Brustein, supra note 133; Davidoff Solomon, supra note 138.
140. See Brustein, supra note 133; Davidoff Solomon, supra note 138; see also Tandy
Corp., Annual Report (Form 10-K) (Mar. 30, 1994) (discussing various stores in Item 1 and
divestiture of computer manufacturing businesses and cellphone manufacturing business in
sections on “Discontinued Operations” and “Sale of Joint Venture Interest”).
141. See Davidoff Solomon, supra note 138; see also Tandy Corp., Quarterly Report (Form
10-Q) 5 n.6 (May 12, 2000) (titled 1996 Business Restructuring).
142. See Brustein, supra note 133; Anne D’Innocenzio & Michelle Chapman, RadioShack
Stock Closes Below $1 per Share, HONOLULU STAR ADVERTISER (June 20, 2014), http://www
.staradvertiser.com/breaking-news/radioshack-stock-closes-below-1-per-share/ [https://perma.cc
/E222-BLYC] (“RadioShack’s stock closed below $1 per share Friday for the first time in its
history, reflecting investors’ concern over what lies in store for the long-struggling consumer
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filing for bankruptcy in early 2015.143 Notably, RadioShack did not file for bankruptcy quietly—it tried vigorously to avoid it.144 The question becomes whether
those efforts and the prebankruptcy actions of its lenders helped or ultimately hurt
the company and its shareholders.
As RadioShack struggled to rebrand itself in 2012 and 2013, it secured a financing
package of $835 million to refinance its existing debt and provide additional liquidity.145 The package consisted of a $585 million secured credit facility provided
by a group of lenders led by GE Capital and a $250 million term loan provided by
Salus Capital Partners, LLC.146 Both loans contained a number of restrictive covenants, including one that limited the number of stores that RadioShack could close
in any fiscal year.147 This particular covenant would prove problematic.
RadioShack’s restructuring plan in 2014 included streamlining its operations and
closing approximately 1100 underperforming stores. 148 Unfortunately, the term loan
permitted RadioShack to close only 200 stores per year, with 600 store closings over

electronics chain.”); Jason Mick, Life in These Batteries? What RadioShack’s History Tells
Us About Its Survival Bid, DAILYTECH (Feb. 11, 2015, 12:24 AM), http://
www.dailytech.com/Life+in+These+Batteries++What+RadioShacks+History+Tells+us+About+Its
+Survival+Bid/article37133.htm [https://perma.cc/VY67-WGMQ]; Barry Schlachter, At
RadioShack, a History of Hits and Missed Chances, SEATTLE TIMES (Oct. 4, 2014),
http://www.seattletimes.com/business/at-radioshack-a-history-of-hits-and-missed-chances/
[https://perma.cc/6VLT-LYLN] (“Sales have dropped 33 percent since 2005, when it recorded
net profits of $267 million, compared with last year’s loss of $400 million.”).
143. See, e.g., Rebecca R. Ruiz & Michael J. de la Merced, RadioShack Files for Chapter
11 Bankruptcy After a Deal with Sprint, N.Y. TIMES: DEALBOOK (Feb. 5, 2015, 5:47 PM),
http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2015/02/05/radio-shack-files-for-chapter-11-bankrutpcy/?_r=0
[https://perma.cc/8DAJ-4PNW]. The losses also are documented in RadioShack’s public filings for the period beginning in April 2012 and ending with the bankruptcy filing. See, e.g.,
RadioShack Corp., Quarterly Report (Form 10-Q) (Apr. 24, 2012); RadioShack Corp.,
Quarterly Report (Form 10-Q) (July 25, 2012); RadioShack Corp., Quarterly Report (Form
10-Q) 3 (Dec. 11, 2014) (reporting net loss of $161.1 million for the quarter ending on
November 1, 2014, compared to net loss of $135.9 million for the quarter ending on October
31, 2013); RadioShack Corp., Current Report (Form 8-K) (Feb. 11, 2015) (announcing filing
of Chapter 11).
144. RadioShack Corp., Exhibit 99.1 (Form 8-K) (Sept. 11, 2014) (providing a press release titled “RadioShack Reports Second Quarter Financial Results,” discussing restructuring
efforts).
145. RadioShack Corp., Current Report (Form 8-K) 2 (Dec. 13, 2013) (announcing
financing).
146. Id.
147. Id. at Exhibit 10.1, 66 (sec. 5.2(d) of credit agreement between RadioShack and
General Electric Capital); id. at Exhibit 10.3, 43 (sec. 5.2(d) of credit agreement between
RadioShack and Salus Capital Partners, LLC).
148. See, e.g., Motion of Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors for an Order, Pursuant
to Section 105(a) of the Bankruptcy Code, Bankruptcy Rule 2004, and Local Bankruptcy Rule
2004-1, Authorizing and Directing the Examination of the Debtors and Certain Third Parties
at 8, In re RadioShack Corp., No. 15-10197(BLS) (Bankr. D. Del. Feb. 17, 2015) [hereinafter
Committee Rule 2004 Motion]; Elizabeth A. Harris, RadioShack Pulls Back on Size of Store
Closings, N.Y. TIMES (May 8, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/05/09/business
/radioshack-pulls-back-on-size-of-store-closings.html [https://perma.cc/H8N5-D242].
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the life of the loan agreement.149 Salus and Cerberus denied RadioShack’s numerous
requests for a waiver of the restriction without certain fees, terms, and conditions,
which RadioShack found unacceptable (and expensive). 150 As one commentator observed, “[T]his is also a bit of a game of chicken—if the banks play hardball too
much. RadioShack may end up being forced to file for Chapter 11 bankruptcy, which
will leave the banks fighting over the scraps.” 151
Shortly thereafter, RadioShack began exploring financing and restructuring alternatives with one of its shareholders, Standard General L.P. Standard General provided the following description of these discussions in its September 2014 Schedule
13D filing with the Securities and Exchange Commission:
Standard General has been in discussions with the Company regarding a proposal on a business operating plan and certain ways to improve
the Company’s liquidity position in advance of the holiday shopping season. Proposals under discussion include Standard General and certain
other investors (the “New Investors”) purchasing loans and other commitments under the Company’s asset backed credit facility (the “Credit
Facility”) from its existing lenders. Under such a proposed transaction,
Standard General and certain other New Investors may propose to subordinate their investment in the Credit Facility to other investors in order
to improve the near-term liquidity available to fund the Company’s holiday working capital needs. Pursuant to such a proposal, the investment
by the New Investors could be the first step of a broader recapitalization
of RadioShack proposed to be completed by early 2015, which may include Standard General and certain other New Investors acquiring preferred equity convertible into common equity, board nomination rights
and corresponding changes to the Company’s structure.152
Standard General’s Schedule 13D also revealed that it owned 9.8% of RadioShack’s
common stock, with related entities owning additional shares and with it having options to purchase three million additional shares.153
Standard General and a group of investors purchased RadioShack’s $535 million
credit facility from GE Capital and immediately amended the facility to provide the
company with additional liquidity.154 The investors also entered into a

149. Harris, supra note 148.
150. See RadioShack Corp., Current Report (Form 8-K) (May 8, 2014); see also
Committee Rule 2004 Motion, supra note 148, at 12 (“In connection with the October 2014
Transaction, RadioShack incurred $31.8 million in financing fees as well as approximately
$142 million in additional obligations, despite the fact that the company had suffered losses in
the previous 11 quarters.” (citation omitted)).
151. See Harris, supra note 148 (quoting Anthony Chukumba of BB&T Capital Markets).
152. Standard Gen. L.P., Schedule 13D (Form SC 13D) (Sept. 26, 2014).
153. Id.
154. See Press Release, RadioShack Corp., RadioShack Announces Milestone in
Recapitalization Process (Oct. 3, 2014), http://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases
/radioshack-announces-milestone-in-recapitalization-process-278065871.html [https://perma.cc
/WG3Y-T4WN]; see also RadioShack Corp., Current Report (Form 8-K) 2 (Oct. 7, 2014)
(describing purchase of credit facility and amendments to that facility). Notably, the loans
were purchased by General Retail Holdings L.P. (GRH) and General Retail Funding LLC
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Recapitalization and Investment Agreement, under which the investors would convert their debt into a substantial percentage of RadioShack’s equity if certain conditions were met.155 This additional liquidity infusion allowed RadioShack to operate
through the 2014 winter holiday season, but it did not solve RadioShack’s underlying
operational and financial problems. RadioShack also failed to satisfy the conditions
of the Recapitalization and Investment Agreement.156
Accordingly, RadioShack filed for bankruptcy in February 2015. 157 The bankruptcy filing was premised on a prenegotiated sale of the entire company to Standard
General and other investors through a credit bid of the prebankruptcy debt held by
those investors.158 The bankruptcy case took several different twists and turns, but
Standard General ultimately was the successful bidder for substantially all of
RadioShack’s assets.159 The sale generated little value for the majority of the
company’s prebankruptcy creditors and shareholders.160 For purposes of this Article,

(GRF), each an affiliate of Standard General. Moreover, other investors were partners or
members of GRH and GRF. See Declaration of Carlin Adrianopoli in Support of First Day
Pleadings at 7, In re RadioShack Corp., No. 15-10197(KJC) (Bankr. D. Del. Feb. 5. 2015)
[hereinafter Adrianopoli Declaration].
155. See RadioShack Corp., Registration Statement (Form S-3) (Dec. 12, 2014) (describing terms of the rights offering to RadioShack’s “legacy shareholders” (i.e., existing shareholders other than the investor group) and the issuance of convertible preferred stock to
Standard General and others in the investor group that would be convertible into 20–50% of
the company’s common stock in exchange for debt cancellation if certain conditions were
met).
156. See Adrianopoli Declaration, supra note 154, at 14.
157. Id. at 2.
158. See Debtors’ Combined Motion for Entry of Orders: (I) Establishing Bidding and Sale
Procedures; (II) Approving the Sale of Assets; and (III) Granting Related Relief, In re
RadioShack Corp., No. 15-10197 (Bankr. D. Del. Feb. 5, 2015). “General Wireless [i.e.,
Standard General] was the stalking-horse bidder for the stores with a bid valued at $145.5
million, comprised of $117.5 million in the form of a credit bid of the credit agreement loans,
$18.6 million in cash, and $9.4 million in assumed liabilities.” Alan Zimmerman, Bankruptcy:
RadioShack Asset Sale to Standard General Nets Court OK, FORBES (Mar. 31, 2015,
6:31 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/spleverage/2015/03/31/bankruptcy-radioshack-asset-sale
-to-standard-general-nets-court-ok/ [https://perma.cc/UNN7-TLD6]. Standard General’s credit bid was reduced to approximately $112 million based on a dispute with RadioShack’s other
prepetition lender, Salus. Id. For an example of the various allegations asserted against
Standard General and others involved in RadioShack’s prebankruptcy restructuring efforts,
see Committee Rule 2004 Motion, supra note 148, at 23–30.
159. See Order Authorizing (I) the Sale of Certain Assets of the Debtors Free and Clear of
All Claims, Liens, Liabilities, Rights, Interests and Encumbrances; (II) the Debtors To Enter
into and Perform Their Obligations Under the Asset Purchase Agreement and Certain
Ancillary Agreements; (III) the Debtors To Assume and Assign Certain Executory Contracts
and Unexpired Leases; and (IV) Granting Related Relief, In re RadioShack Corp., No. 1510197(BLS) (Bankr. D. Del. Apr. 1, 2015); see also Zimmerman, supra note 158 (explaining,
among other things, that Standard General’s winning bid also included an agreement with
Sprint for a small cash infusion and a commitment to a “store within a store” concept going
forward).
160. See, e.g., Zimmerman, supra note 158 (“Despite all the [turmoil] associated with the
competition for the RadioShack assets, at the end of the day it would appear to mean little for
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it is important to note that although some of the company’s stores continue to operate
in a modified form under the new ownership, 161 Standard General was the primary
beneficiary of the sale. The corporate entity was not restructured in any meaningful
way that benefited its long-term sustainability or the interests of its prebankruptcy
shareholders, creditors, employees, and other stakeholders.
E. Takeaways from the Case Studies
The Darden and RadioShack case studies illustrate two very different approaches
to activism. Some commentators may find both approaches troublesome, and some
may view them as equally valuable. Undeniably, both activists were pursuing strategies that each believed to be in their own respective best interests; acknowledging
the self-interest and general motivation to increase the investor’s own return on investment, which are present in all activism, facilitates a more meaningful analysis.
Starboard approached Darden as an owner, offering critiques of management and
operations that it believed were depressing the company’s overall value. 162 Starboard
not only criticized, but it also offered potential management and operational solutions. It disseminated its analysis and additional information to all of the company’s
shareholders. Starboard did not extract any fees or value that would not also be received proportionally by all of the company’s shareholders. Although Starboard’s
slate of directors now runs the company, those directors were vetted with and voted
on by Darden’s shareholders.163 Darden also is continuing to operate on a much
stronger platform, with improved performance and likely returns to shareholders. 164
Standard General, on the other hand, first approached RadioShack as a shareholder, but with a plan to own the company’s debt—indeed, a secured position at the
most senior level of the company’s debt structure. 165 Standard General does not appear to have offered any operational or restructuring expertise to the company, and
it did not facilitate the dissemination of information to other shareholders. Rather,
Standard General appears to have situated itself in a position in which it would win
regardless of whether the company restructured or not. In addition, at least based on
allegations in the bankruptcy case, some investors participating in Standard
General’s prebankruptcy extension of credit to the company also sold credit default
swaps on RadioShack that would have become payable if RadioShack defaulted prior
to January 2015.166 Consequently, Standard General held multiple positions
throughout RadioShack’s capital structure and was focused more on capturing

the company’s creditors, most of whom were destined to see a minimal, if any, recovery regardless of who was declared the winner.”).
161. At the time of its bankruptcy filing, RadioShack had 4400 company-operated stores,
1100 dealer-franchised outlets, and 21,000 full- and part-time employees. Adrianopoli
Declaration, supra note 154, at 3. Reports indicate that Standard General will maintain approximately 1723 of those operating locations. See Zimmerman, supra note 158.
162. See supra Part II.C.
163. See supra text accompanying note 124.
164. See supra text accompanying note 131.
165. See supra Part II.D.
166. See supra note 158.
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returns—arguably to the exclusion of all others—through a takeover of the company
as opposed to an operational or financial restructuring.
Notably, each of the above investment strategies is well known and used by various entities in the industry.167 This Article does not challenge the validity or propriety
of either strategy. The Article does suggest, however, that one form of activism may
hold greater value for the corporate entity itself and for more of the corporation’s
stakeholders. The challenge is identifying means to encourage a more Darden-like
approach to distressed companies, recognizing that not all such efforts will prove
successful and that all activism has the potential to reallocate value against the interests of a majority of the company’s stakeholders. The following Part considers the
various alternative activist strategies and draws on the case studies to develop and
propose the targeted proxy access bylaw—a tool that would utilize the discipline and
expertise often present in activism and enhance value for the corporate entity and
more of its stakeholders.
III. PROPOSED SOLUTION: PROXY ACCESS WHEN A COMPANY NEEDS IT MOST
Conventional wisdom posits that debt disciplines management. 168 Debt financing
subjects management to, among other things, conduct covenants, financial and performance metrics, and active oversight by lenders. In theory, such provisions should
encourage responsible management and reduce agency costs. In reality, debt financing can cause management to take excessive risks, limit the company’s future operational and restructuring alternatives, and make the company vulnerable to takeover
bids by distressed debt investors.169 Accordingly, conventional wisdom may not hold
true in every case. A company approaching or facing financial distress may need an
appropriate dose of shareholder activism to discipline management and preserve value.

167. See supra Part II.A–B. In addition, a Darden-like approach is not always successful.
See, e.g., William Alden, Michael J. de la Merced & Jennifer Daniel, The Activist Investor
Scorecard, N.Y. TIMES: DEALBOOK (Dec. 10, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2014/12
/11/business/dealbook/the-activist-investors-of-wall-street.html [https://perma.cc/C8H3-QQWS];
Svea Herbst-Bayliss, Ackman Turns Back on J.C. Penney, Sells Entire Stake in Retailer,
REUTERS (Aug. 27, 2013, 12:39 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/08/27/us-jcpenney
-ackman-idUSBRE97P0TA20130827 [https://perma.cc/WB6Z-KHZ5].
168. See, e.g., Michael C. Jensen, The Takeover Controversy: Analysis and Evidence, in
KNIGHTS, RAIDERS, AND TARGETS: THE IMPACT OF THE HOSTILE TAKEOVER 314, 321–23 (John
C. Coffee, Jr., Louis Lowenstein & Susan Rose-Ackerman eds., 1988) (describing the free
cash flow theory and attributes of debt that discipline management).
169. As a company incurs more debt to try to prolong its life and fix the financial or operational problems, directors may be more aggressive on the premise that the company and shareholders have nothing to lose. Such conduct, however, can damage any remaining value at the
company. See, e.g., Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors v. R.F. Lafferty & Co., 267 F.3d
340 (3d Cir. 2001) (explaining dilemma faced by directors of distressed companies and basis
for theory of deepening insolvency); see also U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n v. Stanley, 297 S.W.3d
815, 822 (Tex. Ct. App. 2009) (citing, where creditor brought action arguing that board approved excessive spending, expert report opining that “that despite numerous ‘red flags,’ the
directors ‘were in total support of the business strategy of “swinging for the fences” in order
to try to pay off the Senior Preferred Stock and return control of [TransTexas] to
Stanley’”(alteration in original)).
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That said, not every kind of shareholder activism is value enhancing. 170 The activism needs to fit the problem. In the context of financial distress, the tool should
encourage management to acknowledge the company’s issues in a timely manner, to
explore all options, and to be open to new approaches and perspectives. It also should
strive to enhance management’s leverage in negotiations with creditors and other
stakeholders. All too often, management of a financially distressed company has
waited too long to address the issues underlying the company’s distress, has borrowed more money to buy additional time, and, as a result, ends up negotiating the
end deal with lenders with little or no bargaining power. 171 As explained below, the
targeted proxy access bylaw is designed to incentivize management to proactively
manage operational and financial distress and to provide shareholders with access to
the ballot when management fails in those efforts.
This Part provides a brief history of proxy access rules and regulations, and discusses the current state of proxy access initiatives. It explores the basic parameters
of proxy access proposals and reviews the ongoing debate concerning the utility of
proxy access. It then explains the targeted proxy access proposal in greater detail,
identifying key elements of such a bylaw, proposed language, and potential implementation issues. It concludes by suggesting the tailored nature of the targeted proxy
access proposal better addresses potential governance inefficiencies than more general proxy access initiatives.
A. An Overview of Proxy Access
The Darden case study illustrates how activist shareholders can use a proxy contest to effect change.172 The typical proxy contest involves an activist shareholder,
who likely owns more than five percent of the company’s stock and has made required disclosures under section 13D of the 1934 Securities Exchange Act (the
“Exchange Act”).173 The activist shareholder will initiate (or continue) conversations
with management to glean knowledge and begin outreach to other shareholders on
an informal basis.174 The activist shareholder is careful not to trip the solicitation
rules of the Exchange Act until it is ready to begin filing materials with the SEC. 175
Solicitations may begin prior to the filing of the proxy statement, but the activist

170. See supra text accompanying notes 83–84.
171. See supra text accompanying notes 83–84; see also supra Part II.B.
172. See supra Part II.C.
173. See 15 U.S.C.A § 78m(d) (West 2015) (codifying section 13D of the Exchange Act);
17 C.F.R. § 240.13d-1 (2015). The rules also require a shareholder who files a Schedule 13D
to update the filing as the shareholder’s holdings and objectives change. See 17 C.F.R.
§ 240.13d-2 (2015).
174. For an example of the start of a typical activist campaign, see David Benoit & Jacob
Bunge, Nelson Peltz Launches Proxy Fight Against DuPont, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 8, 2015, 9:07
PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/nelson-peltz-launches-proxy-fight-against-dupont-1420761264
[https://perma.cc/F39S-9ZHN].
175. See 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.14a-1 to -3 (2015) (defining solicitation and establishing general
solicitation rules); 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-6 (2015) (setting forth the filing and pre-clearance
process for proxy statements).
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shareholder must file any written materials used in the solicitation with the SEC. 176
These additional solicitation materials may contain significantly more information
than the proxy statement, as disagreements between the company and the activist
shareholder often play out more visibly in “fight letters” and other communications
with shareholders that, under the rules, are filed with, but not precleared by, the SEC.177
An activist shareholder pursuing a proxy contest may put forth a full or partial
slate of directors to challenge the company’s proposed slate.178 The activist shareholder’s proxy materials and proxy card are sent separately from those of the company. In the typical proxy contest, each side bears its own costs, and the contest can
be quite expensive.179 DuPont Chemical reportedly spent $15 million to defeat a
proxy contest launched by an activist shareholder, Trian Fund Management. 180
Although some data suggest that proxy contests create value regardless of the outcome, proxy contests are rare and may not facilitate a change in the board.181
Not only are proxy contests expensive, they also are often quite ugly. 182 A proxy
contest is by definition adversarial. The company’s directors do not want the activist
shareholder’s nominee(s) on the board, and they likely disagree with the facts and
arguments asserted by the activist shareholder to support the proxy contest. There
are no predetermined grounds for a valid or useful proxy contest. The activist shareholder’s objectives may be bona fide and in the best interests of the company; they

176. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-12 (2015) (allowing certain kinds of solicitations prior to the
filing of the proxy statement).
177. See John C. Wilcox, Shareholder Nominations of Corporate Directors: Unintended
Consequences and the Case for Reform of the U.S. Proxy System, in SHAREHOLDER ACCESS
TO THE CORPORATE BALLOT (Lucian Bebchuk ed., forthcoming 2005) (manuscript at 3), http://
www.law.harvard.edu/programs/corp_gov/proxy-access-roundtable-09-materials/Wilcox,John
_Shareholder%20Nominations%20of%20Corporate%20Directors.pdf [https://perma.cc/X2N7-5M3C]
(explaining tools often used by activist shareholders in intense proxy contests).
178. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-4(b)(2) (2015) (setting forth proxy requirements).
179. See Michael J. Goldberg, Democracy in the Private Sector: The Rights of
Shareholders and Union Members, 17 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 393, 409 (2015) (“The high cost of
proxy fights have made them rare, and this is exacerbated by free rider problems, and rational
apathy on the part of shareholders with easy exit available through the Wall Street Rule.”).
180. See Jeff Mordock, DuPont Spent $15M To Keep Activist Investor off Board, USA
TODAY (May 19, 2015, 11:18 AM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/money/business/2015
/05/19/dupont-spent-15m-proxy-fight/27575179/ [https://perma.cc/THK5-TLVX].
181. See DONALD M. DEPAMPHILIS, MERGERS, ACQUISITIONS, AND OTHER RESTRUCTURING
ACTIVITIES 100 (8th ed. 2015) (citing studies and finding that “[d]espite a low success rate,
proxy fights often result in positive abnormal returns to target shareholders regardless of the
outcome”); see also Christopher Takeshi Napier, Resurrecting Rule 14a-11: A Renewed Call
for Federal Proxy Access Reform, Justifications and Suggest Revisions, 67 RUTGERS U. L.
REV. 843, 867–69 (2015) (reviewing studies assessing value of shareholder contests and suggesting more recent studies indicate value creation).
182. The public opinion campaign that often accompanies a proxy battle can reach far and
wide. See, e.g., Stephen Gandel, DuPont Activist Battle Spreads from Wall Street to Academia,
FORTUNE, (Apr. 21, 2015, 9:18 AM), http://fortune.com/2015/04/21/dupont-activist-battle
-spreads-from-wall-street-to-academia/ [https://perma.cc/6ZAC-BAZW] (describing the public exchanges and accusations between the activist shareholder engaged in a proxy fight with
DuPont and a Yale University professor).
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also may be purely self-motivated and based on agenda adverse to other stakeholders.183 Regardless of the objective, the fight that ensues can be very disruptive
for the company and its ongoing operations and should not be undertaken lightly.
Proxy access, which generally allows qualifying shareholders to nominate a certain percentage of the board through the company’s proxy materials, does not eliminate the adversarial nature of the process. The simple act of a shareholder putting
forth its own nominee suggests a lack of confidence in the current board and directly
challenges the board’s management of the company. In most cases, the board likely
will oppose the shareholder nominees, and that effort still requires time and money
that otherwise could be devoted to the company’s operations. Nevertheless, proxy
access can cabin the dispute and mitigate some of the costs associated with a proxy
contest.
Proxy access initiatives are not new,184 but they garnered increased attention after
Congress passed the Dodd Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act
(“Dodd Frank Act”).185 The Dodd Frank Act authorized the SEC to adopt proxy
access rules,186 and the SEC was quick to pass a rule—Rule 14a-11—that required

183. See, e.g., Third Point LLC v. Ruprecht, No. 9469–VCP, 2014 WL 1922029, at *7–10
(Del. Ch. May 2, 2014) (reviewing exchanges between the company’s chair, president, and
CEO (William Ruprecht) and the activist investor (Third Point) in the contest of a challenged
shareholder rights plan, and quoting Ruprecht as saying, “The motivation for that [proxy] fight
is only peripherally about returning capital. It is about being on Sotheby’s Board. Mick
McGuire needs that as validation, and Loeb wants that for ego.”); Joe Nocera, Investor Exits
and Leaves Puzzlement, N.Y. TIMES (May 29, 2009), http://www.nytimes.com/2009/05/30
/business/30nocera.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0 [https://perma.cc/XYA8-79EW] (noting that
activist investor William Ackman “had begun the proxy fight [at Target] not because he had a
$1 billion-plus investment in Target shares that was seriously underwater—not at all!—but
because ‘we never want Target to be referred to as a “once-great company”’”).
184. See, e.g., Bebchuk & Hirst, supra note 16, at 330 (“The ability of shareholders to
place director nominees on the company’s proxy materials is an issue that the U.S. Securities
and Exchange Commission (‘SEC’) has been considering for over sixty years.”); Jill E. Fisch,
The Destructive Ambiguity of Federal Proxy Access, 61 EMORY L.J. 435, 440–47 (2012) (describing history of proxy access).
185. Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5301). There is
a rich literature on proxy access generally, including under the Dodd Frank Act and the SEC’s
proposed Rule 14a-11. See, e.g., Lucian Arye Bebchuk, Streamlining Access to the Corporate
Ballot, CORP. GOVERNANCE ADVISOR, March/April 2004, at 28 (2004); Lucian Arye Bebchuk,
The Case for Shareholder Access: A Response to the Business Roundtable, 55 CASE WESTERN
RES. L. REV. 557 (2005); Joseph A. Grundfest, Advice and Consent: An Alternative
Mechanism for Shareholder Participation in the Nomination and Election of Corporate
Directors, in SHAREHOLDER ACCESS TO THE CORPORATE BALLOT (Lucian Bebchuk, ed.,
forthcoming 2004), https://www.sec.gov/spotlight/dir-nominations/grundfest032004.pdf
[https://perma.cc/9ZC2-BFPG]; Brett H. McDonnell, Setting Optimal Rules for Shareholder
Proxy Access, 43 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 67 (2011); Mark J. Roe, The Corporate Shareholder’s Vote
and Its Political Economy, in Delaware and Washington, 2 HARV. BUS. L. REV. 1 (2012);
Stephen M. Bainbridge, A Comment on the SEC Shareholder Access Proposal (Univ. of Cal.,
L.A. Sch. of Law Law & Econ. Research Paper Series, Research Paper No. 03-22, 2003),
http://ssrn.com/abstract=470121; see also supra notes 16 and 17.
186. See § 971, 124 Stat. at 1915 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78n(a) (2012))
(authorizing the SEC to adopt rules that, among other things, include “a requirement that a
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public companies to include shareholder nominees in their proxy materials.187 The
legislation and the resulting rule were grounded in general concerns regarding the
lack of board accountability during the 2008 financial crisis and a belief by some that
proxy access could mitigate that problem. 188 Rule 14a-11 was short-lived, however,
as it was successfully challenged in court. 189 The SEC has not taken any further action on a definitive proxy access rule.
In connection with Rule 14a-11, the SEC also passed an amendment to Rule 14a8 that authorized the use of shareholder proposals to initiate changes to the board
nomination process. As the SEC explained:
[W]e are amending Rule 14a-8(i)(8) to preclude companies from relying
on Rule 14a-8(i)(8) to exclude from their proxy materials shareholder
proposals by qualifying shareholders that seek to establish a procedure
under a company’s governing documents for the inclusion of one or more
shareholder director nominees in the company’s proxy materials.190
Under the shareholder proposal rules, a company must include the shareholder
proposal in its proxy materials unless the company has grounds to exclude it. 191

solicitation of proxy, consent, or authorization by (or on behalf of) an issuer include a nominee
submitted by a shareholder to serve on the board of directors of the issuer”).
187. See Facilitating Shareholder Director Nominations, 75 Fed. Reg. 56,668, 56,668
(Sept. 16, 2010) (to be codified at 17 CFR pts. 200, 232, 240, 249) (“The new rules will require . . . a company’s proxy materials to provide shareholders with information about, and
the ability to vote for, a shareholder’s, or group of shareholders’, nominees for director”);
17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-11, invalidated by Business Roundtable v. Sec. Exch. Comm’n, 647
F.3d 1144 (D.C. Cir. 2011).
188. See, e.g., Stephen M. Bainbridge, Dodd-Frank: Quack Federal Corporate
Governance Round II, 95 MINN. L. REV. 1779, 1795–97 (2011) (discussing factors leading to
passage of certain federal legislation, including the Dodd-Frank Act); Rachelle Younglai,
Shareholders Win More Rights To Influence Boards, REUTERS (Aug. 25, 2010, 1:32 PM),
http://www.reuters.com/article/us-sec-proxyaccess-idUSTRE67M54420100825 [https://perma.cc
/49CU-DR5W] (describing justifications for and arguments against Rule 14a-11 and quoting
SEC Chair Mary Schapiro, “As a matter of fairness and accountability, long-term significant
shareholders should have a means of nominating candidates to the boards of the companies
that they own.”).
189. See Business Roundtable, 647 F.3d at 1156.
190. Facilitating Shareholder Director Nominations, Release Nos. 33-9136, 34-62764, 75
Fed. Reg. 56,668, 56,677 (Sept. 16, 2010) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 200, 232, 240, 249).
191. Companies have tried to exclude proxy access proposals under Rule 14a-8(i)(9) (direct conflict; SEC took no position on this exclusion during 2015 proxy season), Rule 14a8(i)(10) (substantial implementation), and Rule 14a-8(i)(11) (duplication), as well as Rules
14a-8(i)(7) (ordinary business) and 14a-8(i)(3) (contrary to rule), with varying degrees of success. See, e.g., Trinity Wall Street v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 792 F.3d 323 (3d Cir. 2015) (discussing exclusions under Rules 14a-8(i)(7) and 14a-8(i)(3)); SIMPSON THACHER & BARTLETT
LLP, supra note 9, at 3–8 (reviewing grounds for excluding proxy access proposals); Elizabeth
A. Ising & Kasey L. Robinson, Recent Developments Related to the SEC’s Shareholder
Proposal Rule, BUS. L. TODAY, July 2015, at 1 (discussing exclusion of proxy access proposals
and Third Circuit’s Wal-Mart decision).

264

I N DIA NA LA W J OU R NA L

[Vol. 92:227

Shareholders then vote on any shareholder proposals included in the company’s
proxy materials at the annual meeting.
Shareholders were slow to embrace the shareholder proposal alternative for gaining access to the company’s proxy materials. 192 They are, however, using it more
frequently, with varying degrees of success. The most common proxy access bylaw:
(i) requires a shareholder to own a certain percentage of stock (e.g., three percent),
(ii) requires the shareholder to have owned the stock for a continuous period of time
(e.g., three years), (iii) limits the number of nominees that a shareholder may submit
(e.g., twenty percent of the board), and (iv) may limit the number of shareholders
that can act collectively as a group.193
Companies have responded in different ways to shareholder proposals concerning
proxy access. Some have opposed the proposal, some have supported the proposal
or reached a settlement with the shareholder, and some have tried to preempt the
shareholder proposal by adopting a board-proposed proxy access bylaw. 194 Regardless of approach, many companies appear concerned by, and skeptical of, proxy access bylaws.195
B. The Targeted Proxy Access Proposal
The current approach to proxy access is an all-or-nothing proposition.196 Shareholders either have the ability to nominate directors in the company’s proxy materials
or they do not. But such an approach misses a valuable opportunity to tailor proxy
access proposals to situations that objectively could benefit the company and strike
a more appropriate balance between management autonomy and accountability.
A targeted proxy access bylaw would allow the board to manage the company,
free of challenges through proxy access, so long as management of the company was
well in hand. The board of a company that is profitable and stable—even if some
shareholders believed the company could be doing even better—would not face a
challenge through proxy access. 197 Notably, activist shareholders could still launch

192. See supra note 8 and accompanying text. For examples of the literature supporting
proxy access, see supra note 16.
193. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
194. For example, during the 2015 proxy season, seventy-eight companies included a
shareholder proposal on proxy access with an opposition statement; sixteen companies voluntarily adopted proxy access; six companies negotiated resolutions; seven companies included
both a shareholder and a company proposal; two companies supported the shareholder proposal; and one company provided no board recommendation. SIMPSON THACHER & BARTLETT
LLP, supra note 9, at 14–15.
195. For an example of the literature opposing or raising concerns with proxy access, see
supra note 17.
196. As noted in Part I and discussed further below, the SEC proposed contingent proxy
access in 2003. The target access proposal discussed in this Article, however, differs in significant ways from the prior SEC proposal. See supra notes 18–21 and accompanying text; see
also Facilitating Shareholder Director Nominations, Release Nos. 33-9136, 34-62764, 75 Fed.
Reg. 56,668, 56,677 (Sept. 16, 2010) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 200, 232, 240, 249).
197. This approach mitigates concerns regarding conflicting interests among a diverse and
very dispersed shareholder body, as well as potential short-term objectives of the activist investor. See supra notes 83–84 and accompanying text.
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campaigns against management, but they would not have the benefit of the company’s proxy materials.198 To that end, a targeted proxy access bylaw may deter some
campaigns prior to the targeted proxy access trigger. It also may color shareholders’
perspectives of activist campaigns launched prior to a triggering event: Are such efforts for the primary benefit of the activist, or the company and larger shareholder body?
A targeted proxy access bylaw also could have a prophylactic effect by encouraging executives to manage difficult operational and financial situations more proactively.199 Although management rarely intends to make decisions that worsen the
company’s performance or deepen the company’s financial distress, directors and
managers often are overly optimistic about their decision-making skills and will take
that chance.200 Directors and managers may, however, consider a broader range of
options to mitigate potential distress, knowing the consequences if they are too slow
or too limited in their approach. Likewise, to the extent management tries and fails,
the targeted proxy access bylaw would introduce a new perspective and arguably
change the tenor of the discussions earlier in the process. Shareholders no longer
would have to wait or launch expensive standalone proxy contests to help management implement a turnaround plan. The triggers, if appropriately crafted, would allow more timely intervention. 201
The terms of the targeted proxy access bylaw are key to its effectiveness. A board
or shareholder proposing such a bylaw needs to consider not only the factors identified above in the context of a more general proxy access bylaw, but also the triggers
that would grant the targeted proxy access to shareholders. 202 Although each company should tailor its bylaw to its particular situation and industry, a proponent of
the bylaw should consider the following:

198. For example, activist shareholders may launch a proxy campaign to encourage boards
to distribute value to shareholders though dividends or share buy-back plans. See supra note
75 and accompanying text.
199. In this respect, targeted proxy access is a form of “offensive” activism. See, e.g., Paul
Rose & Bernard S. Sharfman, Shareholder Activism as a Corrective Mechanism in Corporate
Governance, 2014 B.Y.U. L. REV. 1015 (2014) (discussing potential value to offensive activism, including in the context of proxy access); Cheffins & Armour, supra note 72, at 58–61
(distinguishing between offensive and defensive forms of shareholder activism).
200. Conflicts of interest may skew management’s incentives to make good decisions. In
addition, hubris also may impede decision-making. For a discussion of conflicts and cognitive
biases impacting board decisions, see supra Part I.B.
201. As discussed supra in Part I.B, a board may have “ostrich syndrome” with respect to
the company’s financial or operational distress. A board that ignores or delays addressing the
company’s financial or operational issues potentially impairs the company’s ability to restructure effectively and subjects the company to significant outside influence from
debtholders. See supra notes 60–63 and accompanying text.
202. For examples of general proxy access bylaws, see GEN. ELEC. CO., BY-LAWS 7–10 (as
last amended and restated on Feb. 6, 2015), http://www.ge.com/sites/default/files
/GE_by_laws.pdf [https://perma.cc/XL3T-S6JC]; WHOLE FOODS MKT., INC., AMENDED AND
RESTATED BYLAWS 12–19 (effective June 26, 2015), http://assets.wholefoodsmarket.com
/www/company-info/investor-relations/corporate-governance/20150630-Whole-Foods-Market
-Inc-Amended-and-Restated-Bylaws_6_26_2015.pdf [https://perma.cc/3T3G-GVEN].
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 Triggers. Use triggers that are objective and easy to identify. Triggers could
include a material default under a credit facility or bond issuance; a restructuring, refinancing, or forbearance to avoid a material default under a credit facility or bond issuance; a downgrade by one of the major ratings agencies; or
a certain number of consecutive quarters of significant losses (or misses on
other significant financial metrics). The concepts of “material definitive agreement” and “direct financial obligation” under the SEC’s Form 8-K, Current
Report, could guide the kinds of agreements subject to the triggers. 203 A disclosure required by Form 8-K, Item 2.04, Triggering Events that Accelerate or
Increase a Direct Financial Obligation, could also serve as a trigger. 204 In the
case of RadioShack, the company experienced a loss of $139 million, suspended dividend payments to shareholders, and was downgraded by the ratings
agencies in 2012–2013.205 Any one (or all) of these events could have triggered
a targeted proxy access bylaw. In that instance, one or more shareholder nominees could have been seated prior to the company signing its subsequent financing agreements. The triggers should be designed to give the existing board
an opportunity to fix an identified problem, but not prolong and thereby exacerbate the problem. A board proposed bylaw would allow the board to establish
reasonable parameters while recognizing some accountability if it fails. For
example, a target proxy bylaw could provide:
Upon the occurrence of a Trigger Event, the Company shall include in
its proxy statement for [any subsequent annual or special] 206 meeting of

203. See SEC. EXCH. COMM’N, supra note 23. The SEC’s release concerning the 2004
amendments to Form 8-K explains that, in Item 101, the term “material definitive agreements”
has the meaning used in Item 601(b)(10) of Regulation S-K. See Additional Form 8-K
Disclosure Requirements and Acceleration of Filing Date, Release Nos. 33-8400, 34-49424,
69 Fed. Reg. 15,594, 15,596 (Mar. 25, 2004) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 228, 229, et al.)
[hereinafter SEC Release Nos. 33-8400, 34-49424]. Item 601(b)(10) includes “[e]very contract
not made in the ordinary course of business which is material to the registrant and is to be
performed in whole or in part at or after the filing of the registration statement or report or was
entered into not more than two years before such filing,” as well as certain significant contracts
“as ordinarily accompanies the kind of business conducted by the registrant.” 17 C.F.R.
§ 229.601(b)(10) (2016). Moreover, the SEC’s 2004 release also explained that Item 2.03 “requires disclosure of the following information if the company becomes obligated under a direct
financial obligation that is material to the company.” SEC Release Nos. 33-8400, 34-49424,
supra note 203, at 15,598. These terms are further explained in the Instructions included in
Form 8-K. See SEC. EXCH. COMM’N, supra note 23.
204. See SEC Release Nos. 33-8400, 34-49424, supra note 203, at 15,599–15,600.
205. See Drew Fitzgerald, Emily Glazer & Dana Mattioli., RadioShack Gets Loan from GE
Capital, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 21, 2013, 6:19 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles
/SB10001424052702303902404579149800844793012 [https://perma.cc/W35D-ZGUC].
206. This language is bracketed for two reasons. First, companies and shareholders could
specifically define the duration of proxy access. For example, the bylaw could provide that
“Upon the occurrence of a Trigger Event, the Company shall include in its proxy statement
for the immediate four annual meetings . . . .” Such a durational restriction would “reload” the
proxy access after the expiration of the trigger on the theory that the board used the more direct
shareholder intervention for a period of time to assist the turnaround and then continues unless
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shareholders, the name of any person timely 207 nominated for election
(each a “Shareholder Nominee”) to the Board of Directors by an individual Eligible Shareholder or a group of up to [twenty] Eligible
Shareholders. [If the Company’s next annual meeting is more than
ninety days following the Trigger Event, the Company’s board of directors shall notice a special meeting of shareholders for a date not more
than sixty days following the Trigger Event for purposes of implementing
this provision.]208 The Company also shall include the Required
Information209 in any such proxy statement containing the names of any
Shareholder Nominee.
The term “Trigger Event” means (i) a material default or event of default under the Company’s credit agreements, bond indentures, or other
material financing agreements [or could use “material definitive agreements”] that is not cured within the grace period provided by the

and until another triggering event. Second, timing matters in distressed situations. Depending
on the kinds of triggers, the bylaw could contemplate a special meeting of shareholders within,
for example, sixty days of the trigger event to facilitate more timely intervention. See, e.g.,
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 211(d) (2011) (“Special meetings of the stockholders may be called
by the board of directors or by such person or persons as may be authorized by the certificate
of incorporation or by the bylaws.”). Trigger events designed to identify distress as early as
possible may not need such accelerated proxy access.
207. The timeliness of the submission is important. Many proxy access proposals use a
timeframe similar to advance notice bylaws:
[N]ot more than one hundred fifty (150) calendar days and not less than one hundred twenty (120) calendar days prior to the anniversary date of the date (as
specified in the Corporation’s proxy materials for its immediately preceding annual meeting of shareholders) on which the Corporation first mailed its proxy
materials for its immediately preceding annual meeting of shareholders.
WHOLE FOODS MKT., INC., supra note 202, at 13. Notably, shorter time periods may be warranted in the targeted proxy access context, where elections should take place shortly after the
trigger event. For example, a thirty-day submission period may work well with a special meeting of shareholders called on sixty days’ notice.
208. See supra note 206 (discussing timing concerns with the implementation of targeted
proxy access and the potential use of special meetings to address these concerns).
209. The term “Required Information” should include the Shareholder Information,
Nominee Information, and Shareholder Position Statement described below. The following is
an example of a definition for Required Information:
“Required Information” that the Corporation will include in its proxy statement
is the information provided to the Secretary concerning the Shareholder
Nominee(s) and the Eligible Shareholder that is required to be disclosed in the
Corporation’s proxy statement by Section 14 of the Exchange Act, and the rules
and regulations promulgated thereunder, and, if the Eligible Shareholder so
elects, a written statement, not to exceed 500 words, in support of the Shareholder
Nominee(s)’ candidacy (the “Statement”). Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in this Article II, Section 15, the Corporation may omit from its
proxy materials any information or Statement (or portion thereof) that it, in good
faith, believes would violate any applicable law or regulation . . . .
WHOLE FOODS MKT., INC., supra note 202, at 14.
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applicable agreement;210 (ii) the Company’s entry into a refinancing
agreement, restructuring agreement, forbearance agreement, or similar
agreement to avoid or resolve a material default or event of default under the Company’s credit agreements, bond indentures, or other material financing agreements [or could use “material definitive agreements”]; (iii) a downgrade of the Company’s debt obligations of two or
more ratings within a consecutive twelve month period by one of the
major ratings agencies; or (iv) the Company sustaining net losses, as
reflected on its income statement, for four or more consecutive
quarters.211
 Alternative Proposal on Timing and Nomination Process. The value of targeted proxy access stems largely from its potential to assist companies in identifying and remedying financial and operational distress in its early stages. Indeed, a company that lingers in distress too long may have no viable
restructuring options. In such a scenario, the shareholders arguably have little
or no interest in the company; in other words, they have missed their opportunity to add value to the going concern.212 As such, the vesting of the right to
board representation needs to occur in a timely manner; waiting too long to
grant shareholders this right could significantly limit the provision’s utility.
Likewise, the right arguably should lapse after a period of unresolved distress.
Accordingly, proponents of targeted proxy access may consider a provision
similar to that often granted holders of preferred stock—namely, the right to
designate two additional directors to the board in a relatively short period of
time following the trigger event. 213 Such a provision could provide:

210. A board and shareholders should identify triggers that work best for the company’s
business and capital structure and provide sufficient early warnings to allow meaningful intervention in the company’s turnaround. Simply referencing the term “material definitive agreement” may cover all necessary agreements. See supra note 203 and accompanying text.
211. A board and shareholders may want to use additional or alternative triggers. Such
triggers could focus on Items 2.03 and 2.04 of Form 8-K, or even the company receiving a
going concern qualification from its auditors. A company likely would not want to rely solely
on the going concern qualification because, depending on the industry and the nature of the
company’s operations, such trigger may or may not provide sufficient early warnings of the
company’s distress.
212. Commentators debate the value of shareholders’ interests in a company as that company approaches insolvency. As explained at Part I, Delaware courts have determined that
near-insolvency does not change the focus of directors’ duties. See, e.g., supra note 40. Nevertheless, incentives shift as a company approaches insolvency, and shareholders may be willing to take on significantly greater risk than advisable at that point in the company’s lifecycle.
In fact, the shareholders’ perspective could become value destructive, rather than value enhancing. For this reason, a company may want to include a safety valve in its targeted proxy
access provision that “shuts off” the access after a certain period of time in distress or upon
certain objective financial benchmarks. A company and its stakeholders also could at that point
mandate the appointment of a chief restructuring officer, or the addition of a restructuring
expert or creditor representative to the board, to better represent all interests in what likely will
be a liquidation or sale event.
213. See, e.g., N.Y. STOCK EXCH., LISTED COMPANY MANUAL, supra note 25, at
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Upon the occurrence of a Trigger Event, the Company’s shareholders
shall have the right to elect two additional directors to the Company’s
board of directors (“Special Voting Right”). 214 The Company shall include in its proxy statement for any subsequent annual or special meeting of shareholders, the name of any person timely215 nominated for election (each a “Shareholder Nominee”) to the Board of Directors
pursuant to the Special Voting Right by an individual Eligible
Shareholder or a group of up to [twenty] Eligible Shareholders. If the
Company’s next annual meeting is more than ninety days following the
Trigger Event, the Company’s board of directors shall notice a special
meeting of shareholders for a date not more than sixty days following
the Trigger Event for purposes of implementing this provision. 216 The
Company also shall include the Required Information217 in any such
proxy statement containing the names of any Shareholder Nominee. The
Special Voting Right shall terminate on a date that is [three] years following the Trigger Event (the “Termination Date”) and the term of the
directors then serving pursuant to the Special Voting Right shall end
immediately prior to the Company’s next regularly scheduled annual
meeting of shareholders.
 Shareholder Eligibility and the Relevance of the Holding Period. Include percentage ownership and holding period requirements that align the interests of
the shareholder nominating directors with the company; limit the number of
nominees that may be submitted by shareholders and included in the company’s proxy materials; and permit, with reasonable limits, participation by
groups to allow a more diverse representation of shareholders to participate.
These requirements are very similar to the basic provisions included in general
proxy access bylaws.218 Nevertheless, proponents of targeted proxy access
may want to ease the eligibility requirements—including the mandated holding
period—given the urgency of the issues presented by the Trigger Event. For
example, a three-year holding period may impede an activist investor’s ability

§ 313.00(C) (setting forth minimum voting rights of preferred stockholders in listed
companies, including the right to elect two directors to the board “upon default of the
equivalent of six quarterly dividends”).
214. Proponents of this kind of targeted proxy access certainly could enlarge the number
or percentage of additional directors that are elected pursuant to the provision. The mere presence of two dissenting or alternative voices may, however, prove sufficient in many cases.
This kind of provision may require an amendment to the company’s bylaws or certificate to
enlarge the board as necessary to accommodate the additional directors. See, e.g., DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 8, § 141(b) (2011). Proponents also may want to include language that prohibits the
Company from otherwise enlarging or altering the number of directors on the board while the
provision is in effect.
215. See supra note 207 (discussing the timeliness of submissions).
216. See supra note 206 (discussing timing concerns with the implementation of targeted
proxy access and the potential use of special meetings to address these concerns).
217. See supra note 209 (discussing an example of these disclosures).
218. See supra notes 193, 201 and accompanying text.
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to use targeted proxy access to the benefit of the company. 219 Thus, even companies with a general proxy access provision may want to provide enhanced
access rights in the particular circumstances defined by the Trigger Event. The
facts and circumstances of the company’s distress may, on balance, outweigh
any short-termism concerns and tilt in favor of a shorter holding period
requirement.
 Shareholder Disclosures. Require detailed disclosures by the shareholder
nominating directors. These disclosures should include not only information
about its beneficial holdings in the company, but also any related derivative
products, debt, or other interests it may hold, directly or indirectly, in the company. To supplement the disclosures required in Schedule 14N, 220 companies
and the SEC may want to consider a definition of “economic interest” similar
to the following definition of “disclosable economic interest” under Rule 2019
of the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure: “any claim, interest, pledge,
lien, option, participation, derivative instrument, or any other right or derivative right granting the holder an economic interest that is affected by the value,
acquisition, or disposition of a claim or interest.” 221 Understanding the economic interests of the nominating shareholder and its potential agenda are particularly important in the distressed context, as evidenced by the RadioShack
case study.222
 Nominee Disclosures. Require specific disclosures concerning the nominee,
including all relevant information that is provided by the company with respect to
its nominees.223 Notably, the trigger allowing proxy access may help shareholders
identify nominees offering skills relevant to the particular issues plaguing the
company.

219. See Sharfman, supra note 17, at 410–11.
220. See also 17 C.F.R. § 240.14n-101 (2016). Schedule 14N and many proxy access bylaws focus on disclosures concerning the nominating shareholder’s ownership in securities
entitled to vote, and whether any such securities have been loaned or are subject to a short
sale. Although this information is helpful, it does not necessarily provide the complete picture
of the nominating shareholder’s interest in the election. For thoughtful articles regarding the
issues posed by conflicting and undisclosed ownership positions, see Roberta S. Karmel,
Voting Power Without Responsibility or Risk: How Should Proxy Reform Address the
Decoupling of Economic and Voting Rights?, 55 VILL. L. REV. 93 (2010); Usha Rodrigues,
Corporate Governance in an Age of Separation of Ownership from Ownership, 95 MINN. L.
REV. 1822 (2011).
221. FED. R. BANKR. P. 2019. The author is the associate reporter to the Advisory
Committee on the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure, but she was not serving in such
capacity when Federal Rule 2019 was amended to include the definition of disclosable
economic interest in 2011. See also Harner, supra note 67 (suggesting that the SEC amend
Schedule 13D and the related rules to require disclosure of information concerning debt, as
well as equity securities).
222. See supra Part II.D.
223. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14n-101.
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 Shareholder Position Statement. Define the scope (and word count) of the
statement in support that the nominating shareholder may include in the proxy
materials.224 This may be one of the trickier aspects of a targeted or general
proxy access proposal because the information should explain why the shareholder believes a new approach is necessary. Disseminating this competing
perspective is important and valuable in the distressed context. Nevertheless,
it may also be unpalatable to the board. A company should permit statements—
even those adverse to, or critical of, management—provided they are grounded
in facts supported by public documents and do not otherwise violate applicable law.225
The Darden case study illustrates the importance of both timely intervention and
the dissemination of information to all shareholders.226 Notably, companies and
shareholders can benefit from these attributes of proxy access whether the company
proposes a targeted proxy access bylaw or already has adopted a more general proxy
access bylaw. Strategic and thoughtful use of proxy access—only when and as necessary—is an important consideration in assessing the value of shareholder intervention. The factors identified in this section with respect to targeted proxy access also
can and should guide shareholders in using general proxy access to help companies
in operational or financial distress. A key benefit to a targeted proxy access bylaw,
however, is that it focuses the use of proxy access on instances that more objectively
warrant intervention.227
C. Potential Challenges to Targeted Proxy Access
Notwithstanding the suggested benefits to targeted proxy access, implementation
may encounter resistance. For example, boards may oppose such a bylaw because it
still impedes on autonomy and, unlike general proxy access, suggests that the board
may fail at some point in the future. Likewise, shareholders may not believe the proposal goes far enough. And as with any new initiative, there are costs to being among
the first to adopt the proposal, including risks associated with the untested

224. Many proxy access bylaws limit nominating shareholder statements to 500 words.
See, e.g., GEN. ELEC. CO., supra note 202, at 9; WHOLE FOODS MKT., INC., supra note 202,
at 14.
225. For example, General Electric’s proxy access bylaw provides:
The Eligible Shareholder may provide to the Secretary, within the time period
specified in Article VII Section D for providing notice of a nomination, a written
statement for inclusion in the Company’s proxy statement for the meeting, not to
exceed 500 words, in support of the Shareholder Nominee’s candidacy (the
Statement). Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in this Article VII, the Company may omit from its proxy materials any information or
Statement that it believes would violate any applicable law, rule, regulation or
listing standard.
GEN. ELEC. CO., supra note 202, at 9.
226. See supra Part II.C.
227. See supra notes 201–06 and accompanying text (discussing competing considerations
and balance struck by targeted proxy access).
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effectiveness of the concept and increases in the cost of credit. This subpart briefly
addresses the potential concerns of each side to this debate.
Proxy access (whether targeted or general) can subject management to increased
scrutiny and challenge. General proxy access introduces the possibility that management will devote time and money defending its position and warding off proxy access
contests on an annual basis.228 Under the timeline used in many proxy access bylaws,
that could consume three to four months out of every year. 229 That is a significant
period of time during which management may be distracted by things arguably external to the core operations of the business. Although hopefully shareholders would
be more selective and thoughtful in invoking proxy access rights, the concern has
merit.
A targeted proxy access bylaw would mitigate this concern by defining the situations in which proxy access will be available. It would not be an annual contest. It
also would be somewhat in the control of the board to manage. A board may not
always be able to anticipate events causing operational or financial distress, but it
does often have red flags warning of potential problems. 230 A targeted proxy access
bylaw may encourage boards to more readily see and address such red flags. That
said, the trigger of the targeted proxy access bylaw as the company is facing a distressed situation arguably could be more disruptive than in other circumstances. For
this reason, the balance discussed above in defining the triggers is critical.
A shareholder likewise may oppose targeted proxy access in favor of a more general approach that would give shareholders access in any annual election. 231 This
perspective is understandable, given that shareholders cannot predict in advance
when they would like to intervene more directly in management’s decisions. Activist
shareholders do not limit their campaigns to distressed situations. Rather, they often
seek changes at companies that otherwise are profitable and stable. 232 Notably, the
targeted proxy access bylaw would not prevent them from pursuing those campaigns.
It would, however, limit their ability to use the company’s proxy materials to situations defined in the bylaw triggers.
These potential concerns are not new. In fact, some were raised with respect to
the SEC’s 2003 contingent proxy access proposal, which would have given shareholders the ability to nominate directors under certain circumstances unrelated to a
company’s financial health, as well as during its consideration of Rule 14a-11.233
Supporters of triggers believed “that such a requirement would serve as a useful indicator of the companies with demonstrated governance issues.” 234 Those who

228. See supra notes 194–95 and accompanying text (discussing opposition to general
proxy access).
229. See supra notes 202, 207 (providing example of language used in advance notice and
general proxy access bylaws).
230. See supra notes 60–63 and accompanying text (discussing management’s delay in
addressing distress and harmful effects for company).
231. See supra notes 8, 16, 197 and accompanying text (discussing arguments of proponents of general proxy access).
232. See supra Parts II.A, II.B (discussing various objectives of activist campaigns).
233. See Facilitating Shareholder Director Nominations, Release Nos. 33-9136, 34-62764, 75
Fed. Reg. 56,668, 56,680–81 (Sept. 16, 2010) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 200, 232, 240, 249).
234. Id. at 56,681.
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opposed triggers expressed “concern that triggering events would cause significant
delays and introduce undue complexity into the rule.”235 The SEC ultimately elected
not to include triggers in Rule 14a-11 because, among other things, it suggested that
a limited federal proxy rule might not give full effect to shareholders’ state law
rights.236
The advantages and disadvantages to targeted proxy access noted in the context
of the SEC’s rulemaking process are generally valid points. The question in many
ways becomes what are the objectives of federal proxy rules and how can they best
protect shareholders’ rights. Shareholders should have the ability to exercise their
state law rights to vote on directors. Should they also have the ability, however, to
nominate directors in all cases?237 Part of the related challenge is the diverse and
often very dispersed nature of public company shareholders, as well as the fact that
shareholders generally owe no fiduciary duties to the company or other shareholders.238 A company, and arguably even applicable law, better protect the interests
of all shareholders if the designated fiduciaries (i.e., boards) have the ability to nominate directors, subject to appropriate safeguards in situations where boards fail in
their duties.
Targeted proxy access strikes that balance, pursuing a path in the first instance
that allows the company’s fiduciaries to nominate directors and operate the business
in the best interests of the company and all shareholders. Individual shareholders
who potentially have competing interests or adverse agendas do not initially have
those rights, but the board knows those shareholders may gain such rights in certain
circumstances. As one proponent of triggers suggests, “‘triggered’ proxy access
would give shareholders an avenue for dealing with unresponsive boards, but protect
companies from the threat of a proxy access challenge in the absence of a serious
governance or strategic matter.”239
Interestingly, neither side necessarily wins by adopting a targeted proxy access
bylaw, but each side has the potential to succeed in the long run. A board may also
proactively adopt a targeted proxy access bylaw to signal strength and confidence to
the market, backstopped by the shareholders’ proxy access as defined in the bylaw
triggers.240 Although no board likes to admit the potential for failure, it is a reality of
doing business. Targeted proxy access allows a board to define the parameters of the

235. Id.
236. Id.
237. For a thoughtful exploration of shareholders’ rights under state law and how the right
to vote and the right to nominate interact, see Lawrence A. Hamermesh, Director Nominations,
39 DEL. J. CORP. L. 117 (2014).
238. See, e.g., Ivanhoe Partners v. Newmont Mining Corp., 535 A.2d 1334, 1344 (Del.
1987) (“Under Delaware law a shareholder owes a fiduciary duty only if it owns a majority
interest in or exercises control over the business affairs of the corporation.”).
239. Shirley Westcott, Another Busy Year Ahead for Proxy Access, THE ADVISOR, Jan.
2016, at 1, 4, http://allianceadvisorsllc.com/newsletters/another-busy-year-ahead-for-proxy-access
-jan-2016/ [https://perma.cc/K2TD-UQ8G] (describing position of the United Brotherhood of
Carpenters Pension Fund).
240. Ratings agencies could consider whether companies have adopted targeted proxy access as an appropriate oversight mechanism to protect the company’s financial health in rating
a company’s debt.
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accountability tool and thereby eliminate the need for a more general proxy access
bylaw.
Finally, boards may anticipate lenders increasing the cost of credit if the company
adopts a board- or shareholder-proposed targeted proxy access bylaw. This concern,
although understandable, does not withstand scrutiny, provided that the bylaw is
adopted prior to any operational or financial distress. Lenders extending credit to a
financially healthy company likely would view such a bylaw as a neutral or positive
attribute.241 To the extent the bylaw is appropriately designed, the bylaw also should
protect the lenders’ investment and strengthen the company’s ability to repay the
debt upon maturity. A distressed debt investor looking to take over the company
through a bankruptcy or out-of-court restructuring may not approve of a targeted
proxy access bylaw, but such investors often have a different agenda or assessment
of the company’s risk profile. 242 A distressed debt investor may view targeted proxy
access as a potential impediment to a rescue loan or refinancing structure that protects the investor on the downside through significant lender control provisions. Notably, this is exactly the kind of leverage the proposal seeks in part to mitigate.
As with any proposal, the effectiveness of targeted proxy access lies in the details
of each company’s bylaw. The underlying objectives of incentivizing proactive management of financial or operational distress and increasing accountability for related
failures should guide the development of the proposal. Moreover, these objectives
and the balanced approached offered by targeted proxy access make it a useful tool
for both boards and shareholders interested in the long-term success of the company.
CONCLUSION
Boards make hard decisions. They are called upon to vet various opportunities
and alternatives for their companies and, in the process, must determine the best way
forward. Although directors’ fiduciary duties flow to the corporate entity and, in most
situations, shareholders, directors’ decisions affect numerous other individuals and
entities.243 The voices and interests of these other parties can make even simple decisions noisy and complex, and may influence directors’ deliberations.
Noise and complexity grow as a company’s profitability shrinks. Boards of distressed companies face competing demands from creditors, shareholders, and employees. The decisions at hand are of the “bet the company” nature, and the stakes
are extremely high. Moreover, the directors’ fiduciary duties typically remain unchanged, but the company’s senior debtholders may be the only parties at the negotiating table.244 Boards, their companies, and their shareholders would benefit from
activism that balances leverage and also helps boards make better decisions.

241. See Jayanthi Sunder, Shyam V. Sunder & Wan Wongsunwai, Debtholder Responses
to Shareholder Activism: Evidence from Hedge Fund Interventions, 27 REV. FIN. STUD. 3318
(2014) (“We compare loan spreads before and after intervention and show the effects of heterogeneous shareholder actions. Spreads increase when shareholder activism relies on the market for corporate control or financial restructuring. In contrast, spreads decrease when activists
address managerial entrenchment.”).
242. See supra Part II.B.
243. See supra Part I.B.
244. See generally supra Parts I.B, II.B.
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The targeted proxy access bylaw would do exactly that. 245 The proposal would
channel shareholder activism to situations in most need of intervention. It would allow qualifying shareholders to nominate a certain percentage of the board, thereby
introducing new perspectives and potentially targeted expertise to the board. Importantly, the urgency of the company’s situation when a targeted proxy access provision is triggered may warrant more lenient shareholder eligibility requirements,
thereby more readily introducing the shareholders’ perspective into distressed situations. Targeted proxy access also would facilitate the dissemination of additional information to shareholders—information that may counter management’s story and
challenge the status quo. Unlike a more general proxy access bylaw, however, directors would not be open to proxy access contests on an annual basis and would face
such contests only if they fail to navigate any operational or financial distress in a
timely manner.246
Although any proxy access can facilitate needed intervention in times of distress,
a targeted proxy access bylaw strikes a better balance. It gives a board the autonomy
necessary to run a company effectively, but provides a safety valve for shareholders
in the event the board fails. Overall, such a bylaw offers a reasonable compromise to
the proxy access debate and has the potential to help companies and shareholders
preserve value in distressed situations.

245. See supra Part III.B.
246. See supra Part III.B.

